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Abstract 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are often characterized as two of the most vital contributors 
to long term prosperity in the world today. As a result we have seen increased interest in this 
topic both from researchers and managers of government policy. This thesis try to uncover 
how society can better facilitate entrepreneurship through the legal regulation of bankruptcy. 
The analysis is based on a cross-country comparison of indicators measuring the strictness of 
the legal regime and to what extent this affect start-up rates across countries. The data set 
collected for this thesis enable investigation on this
 
relationship for thirteen counties in the 
OECD, in the time period from 1995 to 2007. The hypothesis being that if bankrupt 
entrepreneurs are excessively punished for failure, they may let high-risk but potentially 
high-return business opportunities pass by. Based on the data material at hand this thesis 
finds no conclusive results to support the hypothesis. Key variables suddenly shift direction 
and are often not statistically significant. It is clear that numerous factors play important 
roles when making a productive environment for entrepreneurs and many intricate 
interactions are difficult to map. However, the empirical evidence of this thesis provide 
unconvincing proof related to the effects of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship.  
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1. Introduction 
Why is innovation and entrepreneurship important in a society? Explanations for economic 
growth have traditionally been related to macroeconomic instruments and the overall 
functioning of the economy. Good macroeconomic and structural policies have indeed had a 
great impact on the growth in most OECD-countries the last decades by creating stable 
economies and thereby enabling increased productivity in the enterprise sector. However, 
there is also a recognized empirical connection between economic growth performance and 
the degree of entrepreneurial activity. Experience shows that interactions between innovation 
and entrepreneurship stimulate gains in productivity (Mittelstädt and Cerri 2009). 
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a series of studies concerned with improving 
our understanding of the relationships between entrepreneurship and national development, 
made this connection explicit in the late 90ies. GEM-researchers found that “There are no 
countries with high levels of start-up rates and low levels of economic growth.  High start-up 
rates and high levels of economic growth are always associated” (GEM 2009).  
The transition from an international industrial economy to a global knowledge based 
economy is something many Western countries have had to endure the last decades as a 
consequence of rising competition on industrial wages worldwide. The ability to 
operationalize that knowledge and create comparative advantages within new fields has 
become key to economic survival. New firm formation is the driving force behind structural 
changes in the knowledge based economy. Start up businesses may be carriers of new 
products, new technology and new methods of production. They might be devising new 
business models or even creating new markets. Entrepreneurship fosters national economic 
growth because innovation allows firms to seize market opportunities they earlier did not 
recognize.  
The concept of multi-factor productivity (MFP) has brought attention to several OECD-
countries which have had remarkable GDP growth-rates over the last two decades. The 
growth in the 90ies exceeded the catching-up effect of the 60ies and 70ies. The OECD 
Growth Study in 2001 found that the concept of increased MFP explained more than 50% of 
GDP growth in the last part of the 1990s in eight of the 14 countries with comparable data. 
MFP is based on better utilization of existing resources, and reflects efficiency 
improvements such as improved managerial practices, organizational changes and innovative 
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ways of producing goods and services (Scarpetta et al. 2000). Researchers found that the 
strong contribution of MFP to overall GDP-growth was often not linked to the overall 
functioning of the economy at all. Instead, this new growth pattern was strongly attributed to 
the functioning of the micro level of the economy. The study further identified 4 drivers 
needed for further MFP-growth in the knowledge-based economy; among these drivers was 
the Fostering of firm creation and entrepreneurship.1 
The making of new jobs is an important macroeconomic issue which also is related to 
entrepreneurial activities. It has often been shown that new firms make substantial 
contributions to the labor market by generating significant amounts of employment (Metzger 
2006). The GEM-researchers also stated that “Entrepreneurship makes a major contribution 
to economic well being, both in terms of economic growth and job creation” ... ”Nearly 1/3 
of the differential in national economic growth rates is due to the impact of entrepreneurial 
activity” (GEM 1999). The OECD-report Linking Entrepreneurship to Growth (2001) 
describes its results in the following manner; “Increases in entrepreneurial activity tends to 
result in higher subsequent growth rates and a reduction of unemployment”.  
Being the nation which have the highest rates of entrepreneurship, it is clear that the US also 
agree with these statements; The American White Paper states, ”(there is) clear evidence of 
the power of entrepreneurship in the economy” and “America‟s booming entrepreneurial 
sector is responsible for much of today‟s economic prosperity”. But not only the Americans 
have realized the potential of entrepreneurship. The European Union, in its Lisbon Agenda 
(held on March 23
rd
 and 24
th
 2000), set the strategic goal of becoming the world‟s leading 
knowledge-based economy by 2010. Part of its strategy for renewed economic growth was 
based on increasing the levels of entrepreneurial spirit in its EU-citizens. As the Presidency 
Conclusions stated; “The competitiveness and dynamism of businesses are directly 
dependent on a regulatory climate conducive to investment, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship.” 
Among the many factors that may affect both policy initiatives by governments, as well as 
directly influence the level of start-ups is the country specific bankruptcy regulation. In this 
thesis I will look at how different bankruptcy regimes may contribute to entrepreneurship.  
                                                   
1
 The 3 other drivers included; (I) Seizing the benefits of information and communication technology (ICT), (II) Fostering innovation and 
technology diffusion, and (III) Enhancing human capital and realizing its potential.  
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The thesis is structured as follows; in section 2 I review the background of the concept of 
entrepreneurship and look at empirical evidences linked to its role in promoting growth. 
Chapter 3 presents the problem focused on in this thesis. The fourth section will look at 
bankruptcy legislation across countries, while chapter 5 documents how the bankruptcy law 
and other factors may affect entrepreneurship. In part 6, I describe my data material and 
chapter 7 is devoted to presenting the methodology utilized in this thesis as well as my 
model specification. Chapter 8 outlines the empirical results and in chapter 9 I present the 
conclusion based on these results.  
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2. Background and empirical evidence 
2.1 Definition of entrepreneurship 
So what is entrepreneurship – really? From a Schumpeterian perspective2, entrepreneurs are 
primarily innovators, creators of new ideas, and the pursuing of these ideas may bring about 
breakthroughs in the process of creative destruction. Entrepreneurs might also be described 
as catalysts for change in the economy through their capacity for innovation and risk-taking 
(Armour and Cumming 2008).  Some perceive entrepreneurs having a knowledge filter-role, 
as they are essential in the process of converting knowledge into economic and social 
benefits. GEM recognizes entrepreneurship as any attempt by individuals to start a new firm, 
including any attempt for self-employment. Entrepreneurship may also be defined as a 
distinct attitude (US White Paper 2003). Such definitions as those above may capture the 
many aspects of entrepreneurship, but are hard to measure and compare across countries.  
No single definition exists of entrepreneurship simply because entrepreneurship cannot be 
seen as a single event. Rather it‟s a process of multiple actions taken in several steps. This 
study defines entrepreneurship as the entry of new firms in the economy measured as the 
number of businesses starting up annually. These variables are easier to measure than the 
vaguer notion of an attitude towards entrepreneurship. Furthermore, earlier analyses link this 
step of the entrepreneurship process directly to productivity growth, thereby providing a link 
to the aggregated level of the economy (Audretsch and Thurik 2001).  
2.2 The role of SMEs in the economy 
Business start ups can be used as a proxy for entrepreneurship because a high rate of new 
business starts is beneficial as it contributes to economic growth through its innovative 
entrepreneurs. The emphasis a country place on entrepreneurship can be seen through the 
economy‟s share of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)3. Common to all countries 
                                                   
2
 In his 1911 classic essay, “Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen” (Theory of Economic Development), Schumpeter proposed a 
theory of creative destruction, where new firms with entrepreneurial spirit displace less innovative enterprises, ultimately leading to a 
higher degree of economic growth (Audretsch 2002). 
3
 The Commision of the European Community (6
th
 of May 2003) recommends a definition on SMEs as follows:  
-Small enterprises: Up to 49 emplyees and up to 10 mn in turnover annually 
-Medium-sized enterprises: Up to 249 employees and up to 50 mn in turnover annually 
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with high growth rates is a high degree of SME-predominance. The productivity effects are 
particularly strong in high-tech industries, where start ups are frequent. In many of the 
countries investigated in this thesis SMEs accounted for more than 99% of the total business 
population. SMEs in Norway constitute 99.5% of the total economy (SSB 2009). In the US 
small businesses make up nearly 97% of all exporting firms (US White Paper 2003). Small 
businesses are one of the primary sources of new jobs in the US economy (Berkowitz and 
White 2000). Furthermore, the SME‟s importance worldwide seems to be continuously 
growing.  
The OECD has identified a change in the determinants essential to industry structure. There 
seems to be a global shift away from the trend of greater concentration and centralization of 
companies which was seen in the last decade, towards less concentration, decentralization 
and an increased role of small enterprises and entrepreneurship (Audretsch and Thurik 
2001). The study also finds that the extent to which countries have shifted towards the 
greater impact of SMEs is not similar across all countries. Consequently, the potential effects 
of innovation and entrepreneurship will not benefit all nations simultaneously. From the 
empirical evidence the researchers conclude that countries which have shifted towards a 
greater role for entrepreneurship enjoy higher growth, whilst countries without high start-up 
rates are risking economic stagnation (GEM 1999).   
2.3 How can a country boost its entrepreneurial rates? 
Which framework policies will contribute to higher innovation and entrepreneurship rates 
and thereby higher economic growth? Several important policy areas can be identified and 
interest in entrepreneurship policy has flourished as a consequence of the above mentioned 
conclusions. Many countries are currently taking new initiatives to test the policy potential. 
Because innovative performance will lag without entrepreneurial capacity, entrepreneurship 
policy is typically focused on creating an environment and support system to foster the 
emergence of new entrepreneurs as well as the start-up and early stage growth of new firms. 
There seems to be a trend that survival rates of newly created firms have increased over the 
past few years. This could be a consequence of the more intensive use of business incubators 
and technological clusters as means to support entrepreneurs in many OECD-countries, or 
legal modifications may have played an important role. FORA have found that 
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entrepreneurship policy can generate both jobs and higher productivity especially if it is 
targeted towards high-growth (Hoffmann 2005).  
As the American White Paper stated in 2003 “Fostering entrepreneurship must be a 
cornerstone of our economic policy”. “Failure to foster entrepreneurship in under-
performing sectors is simply an unacceptable policy choice”.  And that “if policymakers do 
not understand the importance of entrepreneurship in the economy and the policy 
infrastructure under which it thrives, we could easily cripple the powerful engine that is now 
driving American economic growth”.   
2.4 The idea of an entrepreneurial culture and the 
importance of stigma 
Many aspects, such as legal structure, access to finance, education and economic cycles may 
impact the policies‟ potential. Among the many factors that contribute to entrepreneurship, a 
key measure is the culture underlying the social interactions, which either legitimize and 
encourage the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity, or do not.  
The entrepreneur is perceived as a risk-taking person, and as one must assume that the 
rational entrepreneur considers both costs and benefits of going into business – 
entrepreneurship will not flourish unless the social value of independence and self-
employment is recognized, entrepreneurs are respected, and their success – or failure, is 
socially accepted. “Successful entrepreneurial cultures encourage people to attempt to create 
new ventures and don‟t seek to punish failure” (Golden 2003). 
For those countries where entrepreneurial activity is an integral and accepted feature of 
economic and personal life, start-up rates are high. “US is among the most entrepreneurial 
nations because Americans believe they have opportunities to start businesses and live in a 
culture that respects entrepreneurship as an occupation” (GEM 1999). ”(In Silicon Valley) 
failure is not welcome, but tolerated. In fact, venture capitalists seem more willing to invest 
in someone who already have failed than in a first time entrepreneur” (US White Paper 
2003). There is more early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the U.S. than in any of the EU-
countries. 
Though some European countries have increased their levels of start-up activity, there is no 
substantial evidence of major cultural or structural changes in favor of a culture for 
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entrepreneurship, yet. Some European countries, included Germany and France, consistently 
have the lowest rates of entrepreneurial activity levels (GEM 2008). However, in terms of 
entrepreneurial opportunity there seems not to be any significant differences – the difference 
seems rather to be in the degree to which opportunities are perceived to exist. GEM-
researchers attribute this feature to the possibility that the relative uncertainty avoidance or 
risk-aversion is higher in European inhabitants than in their American counterparts, and that 
the Europeans seem to prefer employment over self-employment (GEM 2008).   
Business creation is inherently risky and requires both self-confidence and autonomy. 
Entrepreneurs take significant, personal risk in building their companies. As the managers of 
young start ups usually are the entrepreneurs themselves, business distress or even failure 
can become a very personal affaire. In addition to reputational and financial losses, 
entrepreneurs and managers incur huge psychological costs, often referred to as stigma, 
when filing for bankruptcy (Shepherd 2003).  
 In countries where lack of social appreciation and understanding of entrepreneurship 
prevail, business bankruptcy is not sufficiently understood and recognized as a natural part 
of the economic development, and the opportunity for a new start is thus notably reduced. 
This stigma on failure will in turn be reflected in the rates of business births and 
consequently job creation every year as it is likely that this stigma deter would-be 
entrepreneurs from pursuing their visions. Indeed, fear of failure is listed as one of the 
European country‟s top reasons for not establishing a business in the Global GEM-report of 
2008. 
2.5 Linking entrepreneurship to bankruptcy regulation 
As mentioned, the OECD Growth Study of 2001 identified fostering firm creation and 
entrepreneurship to be one of the main drivers of MFP-growth in a society. A follow-up 
OECD study of 2005 further recognized several framework conditions affecting firm 
creation and entrepreneurship. Bankruptcy-regulation and entrepreneurial education proved 
to be two of the three most important aspects of this framework. Especially changes in 
bankruptcy regulation were found to affect the perceived business opportunities available in 
a society and the public‟s interest for establishing new firms. This view is supported by the 
world‟s largest foundation dedicated to entrepreneurship, The Ewing Marion Kaufmann 
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Foundation in the US, which highlights the area of bankruptcy legislation as important in 
promoting a country‟s entrepreneurship culture (FORA 2009).  
There is a two-dimensional effect of bankruptcy-regulation on entrepreneurship development 
that seems to be particular important. Initially, the legislation will influence incentives for 
risk taking. A recently published ECGI working paper by Armour & Cumming (2008) found 
that changes that make bankruptcy laws more forgiving towards debtors are associated with 
increases in the self-employment rate
4
. The severity of bankruptcy law have an impact on 
entrepreneurial activity as strict legislation affect the willingness of marginal entrepreneurs 
afraid of the damaging consequences of a possible bankruptcy, to enter the marketplace and 
start their own enterprise.  
An entrepreneurial-friendly bankruptcy law, on the other hand, can encourage more active 
and vibrant entrepreneurship development through the offering of a partial insurance against 
the consequences of failure (Lee 2007). Thereby lowering the threshold of risk tolerance 
needed for the entrepreneur to start his own business. Armour & Cumming (2008) find these 
effects to be consistently statistically significant and economically large.  By changing the 
regulation, policy-makers might affect an individual‟s fear of failure and risk-aversion or 
risk-tolerance, thereby reducing or increasing the propensity of new business establishments.   
If a startup company were to go bankrupt, the experience and challenges faced by the 
entrepreneur might make him better suited to succeed with a second start up. Studies have 
shown that re-starters often do better than first-time starters although they have to overcome 
additional obstacles, as obtaining credit (The European Commission 2009). The harshness 
and severity with which insolvency law deals with persons who have become unable to pay 
their debts affect the possibility of restarting following bankruptcy. Particularly, the degree 
of punishment or forgiveness that a debtor receives under the bankruptcy law will shape the 
consequences of business failure. If bankrupt entrepreneurs are excessively punished for 
failure, they may let high-risk but potentially high-return opportunities pass. OECD states, 
“Limited chances of financial rehabilitation will affect the ability of entrepreneurs to return 
to the marketplace” (Larsen 2006). Therefore, it is crucial to minimize the social stigma 
related to bankruptcy as well as the judicial restrictions imposed on the debtor‟s ownership. 
                                                   
4
 That is, the proportion of the population who is self-employed.  
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Also, the duration creditors have claims on the honest bankrupt‟s asset – preventing him 
from starting over again – is an important influence on the number of new firms established. 
Secondly, simplifications within procedural regulation regarding insolvencies may also 
contribute to increased levels of startups as lengthy bankruptcy proceedings will make the 
possibilities for a new start more costly and complicated for the entrepreneur. The cost of 
bankruptcy is positively correlated with the length of time spent on the legal procedure.  Less 
time spent in the process of insolvency will encourage entrepreneurship development by 
decreasing the downside risk of entrepreneurs. “A fast procedure leads to quick reallocation 
of assets of failed firms to better users. At the same time, a fast procedure can free an 
entrepreneur from a failing business and provide an opportunity to start a new one“ 
(Bebchuk 2000). The average time to complete a bankruptcy in the EU varies between 4 
months
5
 to 9 years.
6
 In comparison, the bankruptcy procedure in the United States is on 
average more efficient. The number of days spent in the U.S. on Chapter 11 reorganization 
bankruptcies during 2000 to 2002 was 296 (Doing Business indicators 2003).  A speedy and 
cost efficient bankruptcy procedure, which maximizes the value of the assets in a bankruptcy 
estate when reallocating resources, is crucial for fostering firm creation and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
 
                                                   
5
 Ireland 
6
 Chezh Republic 
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3. Objective of the thesis and the problem at hand 
The empirical evidence cited above shows that a policy of promoting a second chance for 
entrepreneurs who are at risk or have failed is essential to building a healthy innovative 
culture. This report will mainly focus on bankruptcy-regulation and its influence on 
entrepreneurship, as profound understanding of the drivers of entrepreneurship and thereby 
MFP-growth is the key to further increasing GDP across nations. 
Prior research on the understanding of how entrepreneurship can create value in a society has 
mainly been based on how barriers to the entry of new firms into the economy can be 
lowered. However, there seems to be relatively little work on how to lower barriers to exit a 
business and to help the entrepreneurs restart again, such as bankruptcy legislation. And very 
little research is done on the exact relationship between elements of bankruptcy regulation 
and entrepreneurial activity. National insolvency laws reveal insufficient recognition of 
overlaps and linkages between bankruptcy regulation and entrepreneurship development. 
There is little knowledge of the effect of bankruptcy legislation and not much evaluation and 
research on this subject is conducted in most countries. According to the OECD “It is likely 
that bankruptcy legislation is not efficient in all countries” (Larsen 2006). 
This thesis‟ objection is to identify and examine the critical areas of bankruptcy regulation 
which are believed to affect the levels of entrepreneurship, and especially serial-
entrepreneurship. Particularly, what role the law‟s forgiveness plays in the entrepreneurial 
process and how the regime‟s characteristics influence the innovative culture and fear of 
failure. The question is to what extent bankruptcy regulation can affect the level of 
entrepreneurship at a societal level, measured by the number of new business start ups 
annually. The problem can formally be stated as:  
 
How do the characteristics of national bankruptcy-regulation affect the level of 
entrepreneurship in a society?  
My analytical objective is to review bankruptcy laws including business rights in the 
insolvency procedure, repayment periods and exemption levels. In addition, to be able to 
develop a better understanding of the drivers of entrepreneurship, I will also explore how 
several other well selected framework conditions affect the levels of new start-ups and 
stimulate entrepreneurship performance. Amongst these are higher educational levels as a 
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proxy for entrepreneurial knowledge, unemployment rate as a possible explanation for high 
levels of self employment, GDP growth to account for favorable or unfavorable economic 
cycles and legal origin as a proxy for the effect of bankruptcy changes.  
This research may uncover how society can better facilitate entrepreneurship, including 
through the legal system. The analysis is based on a cross-country comparison of indicators 
measuring both performance and the underlying business environment for entrepreneurship. 
Before we go any further on the methodological aspects of this thesis I wish to dig a bit 
deeper into the idea of bankruptcy; starting with its main purpose, as I have yet to justify the 
need for a bankruptcy code.  
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4. Bankruptcy legislation across countries 
4.1 Definition of bankruptcy 
The purpose of bankruptcy regulation is to balance the two contradictory interests of the 
parties involved in a business financing. The creditors‟ interests need to be protected to 
ensure a functioning credit market for enterprises so firms can raise external finance. Still, 
the entrepreneur‟s willingness to take risks needs to be encouraged to ensure further growth 
in the society. There needs to be a balance between the public interest in protecting the 
financial security of creditors on one hand and the public interest in allowing an insolvent 
individual to make a fresh start. 
Insolvency occurs when the debtor is unable to pay his debts and other liabilities as they fall 
due. Bankruptcy is a general macroeconomic policy that applies to everyone in the society, 
and it provides a mandatory and orderly mechanism for the realization of the insolvent‟s 
assets. When applied, the process of bankruptcy is generally a collective enforcement 
procedure whereby the debtor‟s assets are liquidated and the money raised is used to pay his 
creditors.  
The purpose of the bankruptcy process is to introduce a legislative mechanism that provides 
a fair and peaceful resolution of financial conflict between debtors and creditors. When a 
debtor becomes insolvent, creditors have incentives to enforce their individual claims as 
quickly as possible. Even if this result in an inefficient liquidation and a reduced overall 
value being obtained for the debtor‟s assets, it is shown that creditors will compete among  
themselves for recovery of their claims (Armour and Cumming 2008). To prevent the 
creditors from racing to realize their claims and to secure the debtor from excessive pressure 
from the creditor‟s attempts to collect their debts first, the legal principle of equal partition is 
introduced – under which all creditors are treated equally7. Bankruptcy provides a way to 
make the diverse group of creditors act as one by imposing a collective and compulsory 
proceeding on them.  
 
                                                   
7
 Exceptions of course occur if some creditors have preferential claims, such as mortgage. 
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4.2 Creative distuction and business churn 
Empirical studies on bankruptcies show that this is a very common phenomenon. Indeed, 
hundreds of thousands of firms and sole proprietors around the world declare themselves 
bankrupt every year. Bankruptcies account for some 15% of all company closures in the EU. 
On average 700,000 European SMEs and nearly 2.8 million jobs are involved in insolvency 
proceedings throughout Europe on an annual basis (The European Commission 2008). 
About 10% of U.S. jobs cease to exist every year due to bankruptcies and other business 
closures (US White Paper 2003). 
There is reason to believe that increased global competition requires entrepreneurs and 
enterprises to react more rapidly and flexibly, but not all enterprises have the necessary 
resources or opportunities needed to adapt to the continuous change and restructuring 
attached to the development of new products, innovation and new technologies. SME-
entrepreneurs are three times as likely to petition a personal bankruptcy as their counterparts 
in the general population (Sullivan et al. 1989).The EU Commission stated in 2009; “Global 
competition and new paths imply hidden obstacles and unexpected sources of mistakes. 
These can easily be fatal for vulnerable businesses, especially smaller ones". 
Continuous firm creation and firm death is a normal economic phenomenon, often referred 
to as “creative destruction”. This business churning within the entrepreneurship sector, 
where innovations both creates and destroys economic activity and employment is an 
integral part of a strong and healthy economy. There is a high correlation between entry and 
exit rates in both the EU and the US, suggesting a continuous process of creative destruction 
(The European Commission 2007). 
 A low survival rate is thus not necessarily a cause for concern, new firm entry is part of the 
process whereby entrepreneurs react to market reality – changing tastes and preferences, new 
technologies, and changes in demography and geography. Low productivity firms exit the 
market and are replaced by new ones; there is a permanent flow of resources from inefficient 
users to more efficient users. In any economy, letting some failing firms seize to exist is 
essential to a society‟s economic health. Any optimal social strategy would not be to reduce 
insolvencies to zero, but to support viable companies and lower the exit barriers to be able to 
improve economic efficiency and growth. 
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However, as mentioned, bankruptcy regulation can generate ex post barriers to exit. When 
these barriers are very strict on the entrepreneur, such as not allowing them to walk away 
from a heavy debt load, they may try to avoid business exit altogether (Ahlstrom and Bruton 
2004). Thus these firms continue to consume resources that could have otherwise been put to 
more productive use (Lee et al. 2007). The role of business failure in economic life is not 
well understood in the European society. As mentioned, stigma is present in the business 
environment and also in cultural and social aspects of the community. Studies have shown 
that 47% of Europeans would be reluctant to order from a previously failed business and 
51% would never invest in businesses in financial difficulties (The European Commission 
2007). Of course, even entrepreneurs in the more risk-willing U.S. will find it difficult to 
obtain credit their second time around; but as in Silicon Valley, one can see proof of a 
favorable entrepreneurial culture and climate.  
 
4.3 Differences in bankruptcy legislation across countries 
Bankruptcy legislation across countries differs significantly along many dimensions. Most 
jurisdictions have several insolvency options – meaning, different bankruptcy procedures 
available for corporate and individual debtors. The variety of regulations established often 
reflects the country‟s focus on and promotion of either creditor or debtor rights. The 
possibilities for out-of-court settlements, reorganization and automatic stay on assets; 
liquidation, exemptions and the discharge or duration of creditor‟s claims are all external 
conditions of high relevance for an entrepreneur. The range of insolvency procedures 
available in different countries demonstrates several contrasting approaches to bankruptcy. 
Thus the support for saving financially distressed companies, the possibilities for efficiently 
reorganizing a firm, and thereby the chances of getting a fresh start for the debtor vary 
significantly from country to country.  
For insolvent or economically distressed firms there are three possible ways to approach 
bankruptcy: 
(I) Out-of-court settlement 
Insolvent entrepreneurs attempt to negotiate an arrangement with creditors to 
secure the continuation of their business. The arrangement often includes a 
restructured payment scheme, postponement and reduction of claims and 
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payment terms, and/or the deletion of debt all together. Firms typically resort to 
this solution first as it is considerable less expensive than the alternatives.  
 
(II) Reorganization bankruptcy 
Basically involves the same procedures as the out-of-court composition above. In 
addition, reorganization arrangements may involve court supervision, a 
possibility for the majority of claimant‟s votes to be binding for the minority, and 
a temporary automatic stay on the debtor‟s assets to prevent aggressive actions 
from creditors. Examples of this type of regulation are “Chapter 11” in the 
American Bankruptcy Code, the rules regarding “Tvangsakkord” in the 
Norwegian bankruptcy-law, Konkursloven; and the French Code of 
“Redressement Judiciare” (juridical arrangement). 
 
(III) Liquidation bankruptcy 
Involves court intervention and liquidation of all company assets which are then 
distributed to the firm‟s creditors. Corporations cease to exist, whilst bankrupt 
entrepreneurs who have provided personal guarantees may struggle with 
repayment to creditors for a longer time period. Examples of national regulation 
in this regard are “Chapter 7” in the US, and the “Konkursordnung” in Germany 
(pre-1999).  
 
4.3.1 Exemptions 
In the case of personal bankruptcy many of the debtor‟s possessions will be exposed to 
claims from the creditors. However, exemptions do exist. A failed non-corporate 
entrepreneur will be able to exempt from the bankrupt estate certain personal assets 
necessary to obtain a decent way of life. Exemption levels vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, ranging from very strict regulations, such as France where also spousal property 
can be pulled into the debtor‟s estate to highly generous exemption levels as in certain states 
of the U.S. (Armour and Cumming 2008). 
As an example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is regulated on a federal level, while directives 
regarding homestead exemptions are regulated by state law. One implication of this split 
legislation is considerable variation across the American states. One way to measure the 
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severity of debtors treatment by bankruptcy legislation is to investigate the extent to and 
which assets can be exempt from the process of seizure. This has been done by White  
(2007) which find that “in (American) states with higher exemption levels, individuals are 
more likely to own businesses because generous exemptions cushion them against the 
consequences of business failure”. Armour & Cumming (2008) also find support for that in 
line with intuition; larger exemptions are positively associated with levels of 
entrepreneurship in the U.S.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that higher personal property exemption levels also can contribute to 
creditors denying applicants or strengthening their credit demands, as a result of 
entrepreneurs located in high exemption states being more likely to file for bankruptcy and 
less likely to repay their debts. The final effect of exemptions on entrepreneurship is vague 
and will be explored closer in this thesis.  
 
4.3.2 Automatic stay on assets  
Even though financial distress and insolvency are tough on the honest entrepreneur, 
bankruptcy law may provide regulations favorable for the debtor as well – such as automatic 
stay on assets upon the initiating of bankruptcy proceedings. This means that in the event of 
insolvency a moratorium arise, meaning that the creditors must all cease efforts of debt 
collection and instead direct their claims to the court.  
North American and most European countries allow failed companies to be reorganized 
through court insolvency proceedings. Under this legal system, a stay on assets will be 
favorable for the entrepreneur who then keeps control of the company and its assets through 
the restructuring process. As a main rule, any firm involved in a reorganization bankruptcy 
will remain in operation, giving creditors and management time to negotiate before deciding 
whether the firm needs to be liquidated (Franks et al. 1996). 
In the U.S., bankruptcy legislation instructs automatic stay on assets in the case of 
reorganization. The U.S.‟ Bankruptcy code is characterized as particularly pro-debtor 
because it allows managers and entrepreneurs to continue to run the firm while negotiations 
with creditors are in progress. In Norway and the UK, an insolvency practitioner (usually an 
attorney) would be appointed to administer the estate. This insolvency practitioner would 
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then have the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan. The recent German change in 
bankruptcy legislation introduced an automatic stay on assets for up to three months. Earlier 
this directive of moratorium did not extend to secured creditors, which led to the vast 
majority of firms in financially distress in Germany being liquidated as the secured creditors 
had strong incentives to opt for this type of bankruptcy (Kaiser 1996). Very few enterprises, 
in fact only 0.3 % of firms in the German economy, previously utilized the option of 
reorganization because of the absence of automatic stay of assets (Franks et al. 1996). 
 
4.3.3 Repayment period 
A bankrupt debtor may be permitted to obtain a fresh start through discharge of his 
outstanding debt. That is, after a certain period of time repaying his debts the debtor is 
permitted to dismiss his outstanding credit obligations and emerge from the bankruptcy 
composition. By discharging bankrupt entrepreneurs, creditors can claim residual assets but 
cannot pursue any remaining claims that have not been met. Thus the debtor obtains a fresh 
start. The number of years a bankrupt must wait until he may be discharged (if at all) from 
pre-bankruptcy indebtedness may affect repeat entrepreneurship.  
Rules regarding the duration of the creditor‟s claims on the possessions of the debtor are in 
most countries specifically stated in the law. Legislation in the U.S. and Canada specify this 
period to be less than one year. United Kingdom also reduced its creditor claims-period from 
three to one year in 2004. These three nations are at the Top 5 when it comes to discharge of 
debt and thereby enabling a fresh start for the entrepreneur. Repeat entrepreneurship is 
common in jurisdictions in which a fresh start is permitted (Baird and Morrison 2005). For 
example, about 50% of American entrepreneurs who had filed Chapter 7 liquidation 
bankruptcy for their start-ups in the years from 1989 to 1993 restarted a new firm by 1993 
(Landier 2004).  
The Nordic countries on the other hand, are known for their restrictive bankruptcy 
regulations and long discharge-periods. In the absence of a legally protected fresh start, 
creditors can pursue any remaining claims for several years. A bankrupt entrepreneur in 
Finland often experience to struggle with creditor repayment-plans for up to ten years after a 
bankruptcy, no matter if he is to blame or not. Ireland grants automatic discharge to honest 
entrepreneurs who have tried but failed with their ventures. However, in Ireland the debtor 
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has to pay his debts for 12 years before he may be granted a discharge. Such unforgiving 
bankruptcy laws, with no real discharge from pre-bankruptcy debts, will consign the 
entrepreneur to the “economic dustbin”, as he must pay the majority of his future income to 
past creditors for years to come.  
According to the OECD Survey “Policy Questionnaire on Bankruptcy” (2005) the 
possibilities for reorganizing a company in financial distress and chances of getting a fresh 
start in case of insolvency appear to be lower in Norway than in other OECD countries 
where fast track mechanisms for reorganization and efficient discharge proceedings for 
legitimate bankruptcies are available. When an entrepreneur has to personally repay the debt 
for past failure in business, there is less incentive to take the risk of starting up a new firm. 
Still, indicators show that because of efficient business closure and smooth exit for not 
viable businesses, the investor‟s potential loss is limited in Norway (Mittelstädt and Cerri 
2009).  
In Germany, legislation permitting discharge from personal indebtedness after seven years 
was introduced for the first time during 1999, and then reduced to six years in 2001. 
Previously the German legislation allowed for a lengthy pursuit of bankrupt entrepreneurs as 
the creditors could go beyond claiming residual assets and the debtor often remained liable 
for unpaid debt for up to 30 years (Lee et al. 2007). Spain and Italy also introduced similar 
entrepreneurial-friendly measures in their bankruptcy laws recently (The European 
Commission 2007)
8
.  
4.4 Incentives for a fresh start 
The average level of entrepreneurship is lower within the European bankruptcy system, than 
in the American. Studies have found that the level of entrepreneurship in the U.S. is over 
three times that in Germany and France, and twice that of the UK (GEM 1999). The U.S. has 
an extremely forgiving bankruptcy regime for small business debtors. Such different rules of 
the game have lead to a huge difference in risk-taking propensity between American and for 
example German entrepreneurs. However, as mentioned above, recent initiatives at EU level 
have attempted a so called Americanization of the bankruptcy code in many of the European 
                                                   
8 However, these countries are not part of the data set in this thesis. 
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nations (Elul et al. 2002). These schemes seek to promote entrepreneurship by reducing the 
harshness of consequences related to personal bankruptcy, particularly affecting 
entrepreneurs. There seems to be a change towards a policy commitment in EU at both 
national and regional levels to address the issue of stigma concerning business failure and to 
promote fresh starts. This in turn points towards a significantly more prominent role of law 
in stimulating entrepreneurial activity in the EU.  
Nevertheless, there is yet work to do; the EU-Commission stated in 2007, “Indeed, there is 
still room to go further to foster a more positive attitude towards entrepreneurship, to 
encourage more people to start up and to reduce risks and the stigma of failure” (The 
European Commission 2007).  
Many countries are currently in the process of making their bankruptcy legislation more 
entrepreneurship friendly. Although there have been varying degrees of real legislative 
change, half of the EU‟s member states have taken measures to reduce repayment periods, 
remove restrictions or streamline bankruptcy proceedings to make them more efficient and 
predictable for all parts involved.  
 
See Appendix B for a comprehensive run through of cross-country bankruptcy regulations 
including recent changes.  
4.5 The second time around 
A fresh start can ease the negative impact of bankruptcy on jobs, consumers and creditors by 
contributing to further growth in the society. Re-starters learn from their mistakes and are 
generally more successful second time around. Also their businesses grow faster in terms of 
performance, turnover and employment. Research done at EU level concerning successful 
entrepreneurs show that 18% had already run one enterprise and 6% of them had run two or 
more (The European Commission 2007).  
The knowledge and understanding determined entrepreneurs acquire are often referred to as 
entrepreneurial experience. Entrepreneurial experience is a special type of business 
ownership know-how. The human capital theory states that individuals with high levels of 
within-industry experience or academic education are more successful than others due to 
higher levels of human capital. Entrepreneurial experience can be defined as a kind of 
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human capital as it involves understanding and building of knowledge within very many 
different areas of the economic and technological sectors. Managers of the many SMEs and 
the majority of all new start ups are typically the entrepreneurs themselves, and they tend to 
play a dominant role regarding the firm‟s financial structure and its development. The 
experience an entrepreneur gathers while working as a manager can be seen as a kind of 
education. Thus, previous entrepreneurial experience should be relevant for firm 
performance and may provide growth benefits for the society at an aggregated level. 
Experienced entrepreneurs may already have business contacts and extended networks that 
help them to discover opportunities without actively searching. They might have increased 
industrial experience making them better suited to evaluate business risk, and they might 
already have a good reputation amongst financers and suppliers. These are all key factors 
behind business success which will benefit society through increased growth and job 
creation. 
Unfortunately, re-starters are still a minority in the European society. Only a small fraction 
of failed entrepreneurs make another attempt to start up in the EU. The majority of them 
would still prefer to be self-employed, but the consequences of insolvency are severe and 
discouraging in Europe. Around 1/3 of ex-entrepreneurs end up selling their home after a 
bankruptcy, negative repercussions reach other family members in 25% of cases and 15% 
ends in broken relationships (The European Commission 2007).  
4.6 Legal company structure 
Some might argue that the personal indebtedness of an entrepreneur easily can be removed 
by simply establishing a limited liability company (ltd). Indeed, this is correct as limited 
companies, or corporations as they are called in the US, are legal entities separate from the 
finances of the person(s) establishing it. In the event of insolvency, the entrepreneur might 
lose his investment in the company but a limited company relieve its investors of all personal 
liability and secure that they are not personally responsible for the corporation‟s debts.  
Still, sole proprietorships were the most common legal form of start-ups in the majority of 
the EU member states in 2005 (Eurostat 2003). This may be due to the cost of incorporating 
a business, in particular minimum capital requirements, which is quite substantial in some 
jurisdictions. Indeed, the Norwegian legislation demand a capital stock of 100,000 NOK 
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which undeniably provide a restriction on the access to limited liability and thereby self-
employment. The cost of establishing a limited company in the UK however, is nearly non-
existing.  
This has led to the development of businesses all over Europe which specialize in helping 
entrepreneurs establish a limited company with origin typically in either the United Kingdom 
or on the Seychelles because of their favorable capital requirements. The Norwegian 
business register call these limited companies by the abbreviation NUF (Norwegian 
registered foreign company), and there have been a substantial growth in the number of 
NUF-establishments annually since the EU-ruling in 1999
9
 which opened for business 
registration in countries other than where the intended headquarters of the company‟s trade 
will be.  
But even with easy access to limited liability registration, bankruptcy law may still be 
expected to affect entrepreneurship. Norwegian banks confirm that they consistently demand 
personal guarantees as mortgage from starting entrepreneurs who have yet to build value 
within the company. This personal guarantee is in essence a wiping out the limited liability-
protection incorporation otherwise provides. Because creditors frequently demand these 
guarantees from entrepreneurs, the ltd-concept loses its purpose, and in the case of 
bankruptcy, bank creditors will be free to recover the remaining debts in the debtor‟s 
personal assets. 
Armour & Cumming (2008) investigated the links between minimum capital requirements 
and personal bankruptcy laws and found that the impact of severe bankruptcy laws is 
particularly strong when coupled with a high minimum capital requirement for 
incorporation. On the contrary,  “Forgiving personal bankruptcy laws and ready access to 
limited liability offer significant policy instruments for enhancing entrepreneurial activity” 
(Armour and Cumming 2008).  
 
                                                   
9
 The EU Court of Justice, Centros-verdict 1999 
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4.7 The trade off 
However, there exists a trade-off between the access to limited liability, company credit and 
the severity of bankruptcy law. In other words, bankruptcy law may affect small firms' 
access to credit. This takes the form of a balancing act between the risk taking of the debtor 
and his creditors. As mentioned, the creditors‟ interests need to be protected by law to ensure 
a functioning credit market for enterprises so firms can raise external finance. The EU‟s 
Green Paper found that “If creditors‟ interests are not well protected they will be reluctant to 
invest in new ventures”. In other words, if banks cannot protect their credit they will tend to 
lend less to potentially high growth and high risk enterprises, and at a higher interest rate.  
Insolvency systems are a key element of creditor rights. This is supported in the work La 
Porta et al. (1998). This article finds that countries which better protect creditors and their 
rights have more developed credit markets and financial systems.  
Other research has shown that in the federal states of the US with high bankruptcy 
exemption levels – meaning, in the case of bankruptcy the debtor may keep a larger share of 
his assets – the supply of credit decrease. Small firms are 25% more likely to be denied 
credit if they are located in states with unlimited bankruptcy exemption levels than in states 
where fewer assets are exempt (Berkowitz and White 2000). 
However, the entrepreneur‟s incentives and willingness to take risks and seek credit is 
proportionate to his ability to protect his personal belongings and avoid heavy and long term 
debt repayment in the case of bankruptcy. If the law requires a high capital base for 
incorporation and provides creditors with the right to push a company in early financial 
distress into liquidation, which was indeed the case in pre-1999 Germany, entrepreneurs will 
be more hesitant to establish a start up venture. Demand for credit increase when firms are 
located in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions. This is because higher exemption levels 
provide a so called “partial wealth insurance” for the debtor , making would-be, but risk 
averse entrepreneurs more likely to start a business (Berkowitz and White 2000).  
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4.8 The credit crisis 
Nevertheless, the ongoing financial crisis in 2009 has diversified the undivided appraisal of 
the North American entrepreneurial-friendly bankruptcy code. The number of insolvencies 
reached an all time high in many European countries after the financial crisis was a fact in 
September 2008. During 2008 there were 1.1 million filings for bankruptcy by both 
businesses and individuals in the US. Norway saw an increase of 28% in numbers of 
bankruptcies from 2007 to 2008. Many of these bankruptcies worldwide are filed by 
entrepreneurial firms having difficulties funding ongoing operations. This is a direct 
consequence of the credit crunch and its reduced access to finance even for high-quality 
entrepreneurial firms that would otherwise not have problems acquiring credit. 
Bankruptcy statistics is a trailing indicator, meaning there is a time delay between financial 
difficulties and bankruptcy. Because of this lag in the number of filings for bankruptcy the 
insolvency numbers are expected to stabilize at a higher level as financial problems turn into 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
British policymakers, who in 2004
10
 introduced a bankruptcy reform reducing the debtor‟s 
time to discharge from three to one year to help reduce the stigma of honest failure, have 
recently had to handle strong criticism from UK‟s leading economics institute, the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research. They believe “Britain‟s bankruptcy rules have 
exacerbated the effect of the credit crunch across the country” (The Times 2009). Going on 
to say that “this fostered an environment in which people were happy to take on debt that 
they could not repay, inflating the losses of banks and other lenders”.  
This might be true, but there are empirical evidence that creditors in environments with 
fewer creditor rights adjust to the fact that their security is low by screening possible debtors 
and projects more carefully in addition to demanding higher levels of security (Franks and 
Davydenko, 2006). In contrast, studies show that laws which provide strong protection for 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings may in fact make banks too “lazy” in screening projects 
(Manove et al., 1999). Therefore, it would be easier for businesses to obtain credit and 
financial support for their start ups in a country with strict bankruptcy regulation (Erhvervs 
og Byggestyrelsen Denmark 2006). A legislative change towards a more debtor-friendly 
                                                   
10
 The Enterprise Act, 2004. 
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bankruptcy code should hold incentives for creditors to be harder on their initial analysis of 
potential credit applicants; as mentioned because the debtor has higher incentives to initiate 
bankruptcy.  
There is however, a strong case for believing that the recent peak in business cycles and the 
incredible growth we have seen the last couple of years previous to the Lehman Brother‟s 
bankruptcy and the credit crunch ended in a partial “blinding” of the creditors. An 
implication of this is that the creditor‟s themselves and their internal procedures for 
screening applicants and risk taking needs to take part of the blame for today‟s financial 
situation globally. 
It is found that American borrowers have amplified the scale of the global credit crisis 
because the many individuals who default on their mortgage can leave the property and write 
off any unpaid mortgage bills – thus leaving creditors to take the penalty. This being said, it 
is important to emphasize the fact that it is the U.S. with its debtor-friendly bankruptcy 
regulation that have been the global economic growth engine for the last decades, driving 
growth rates internationally through its extensive demand for goods and high multi factor 
productivity through increasing levels of entrepreneurship.  
The reason for Britain‟s legislative changes concerning discharge for debtors was a belief 
that “It will open up markets, increasing competitive pressures. It will improve consumer 
protection. It will give those entrepreneurs who have failed honestly a second chance and 
help ensure that companies in difficulty do not go under unnecessarily. Together, these 
measures will help promote an enterprise culture and drive up productivity” (The Times 
2009).
11
 
The cost of pro-debtor bankruptcy procedures is less credit supply for small firms and at a 
higher rate. Still, the cost of a pro-creditor system may be characterized as even more severe, 
reducing the overall entrepreneurial activity at an aggregated level. There is a high 
probability that the recent increase in bankrupt entrepreneurs due to the credit crunch may 
result in a holding up of valuable innovative individuals in time consuming and inefficient 
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 Quote by Trade and Industry Secretary at the time, Patricia Hewitt.  
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legal proceedings, instead of allowing them to start over fresh. This may in turn contribute to 
a prolonging of the current financial crisis by dampening further development and growth of 
the economy. 
A good insolvency regime must prevent entrepreneurs from taking irresponsible loans and 
lenders from giving loans with a too high probability of default. Clear distinction between 
honest and dishonest bankruptcies in any bankruptcy legislation is of vital importance. 
Severe legal treatment is justified in the case of fraud or dishonesty, whilst it may be claimed 
that honest entrepreneurs should be able to protect their personal belongings during 
insolvency procedures.  
Modification of bankruptcy law to lower the stigma of failure may help entrepreneurs who 
have failed to try again, but it is important to recognize that such an action is not costless. 
Both private and state-creditors are expected to carry the costs of such redistribution. Still, 
shouldering the costs of establishing an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy code might be in 
society‟s best interest. An economy unwilling to carry these costs of honest entrepreneurial 
failures is not likely to reap the benefits of a vibrant entrepreneurial sector and the growth it 
may bring. 
This thesis is not an assessment of whether the different national bankruptcy regulation can 
be characterized as qualitative good or bad. Rather, I wish to assess how the two parties‟ 
interests are balanced and appropriately protected in the legislation, and if the insolvency 
legislation permit an honest, but unfortunate debtor, to obtain a discharge of his debts and to 
make a fresh start thereafter.   
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5. Factors affecting entrepreneurship rates 
Various determinants of entrepreneurship may be identified in a society. Based on the OECD 
Growth Study of  2001 this thesis will build its explanations of  business entry, and thereby 
aggregated growth, primarily on bankruptcy regulation. In this section I will initially present 
vital aspects of the legally binding insolvency regulation that are of high importance to an 
entrepreneur. Further, the section will go in dept and explain several other factors that might 
affect entrepreneurship rates
12
.  
5.1 Variables linked to bankruptcy law 
The thesis concentrates for the most part on the severity of bankruptcy legislation, focusing 
on whether a bankrupt debtor is being punished or forgiven in bankruptcy proceedings. The 
most important aspects in this regard are the legislative regulation concerning repayment 
period, exemption levels and automatic stay. In addition, the level of bankruptcies each year 
will affect the economies‟ business churn, and thereby its efficiency. Also, the cost of 
bankruptcy proceedings is an essential aspect of the efficiency of bankruptcy law and will 
accordingly receive attention in this thesis. The extent of fear individuals experience when it 
comes to the potential downsides of bankruptcy is important due to its inherent ability to 
characterize the national culture as either pro-entrepreneurial or the opposite; and also 
because it may act as a proxy for the stigma in a society. 
  
5.1.1 Repayment period, exemption levels and automatic stay  
The debtor‟s possibility to obtain discharge of outstanding debts following a liquidation 
bankruptcy is thought necessary to support an entrepreneurial culture, and acts as a proxy for 
the harshness of bankruptcy law imposed on the insolvent. The variable reflects the 
opportunity for the entrepreneur to have a fresh start if he for some reason, usually financial, 
chose to establish a company without ensuring limited liability. 
                                                   
12 Entrepreneurship rates is in this thesis measured as the level of startups relative to the total number of active businesses in a country.  
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Other legal frame conditions vital in this regard are exemption levels as well as companies‟ 
opportunity to obtain an automatic stay on creditor‟s claims in the case of reorganization 
bankruptcy. The opportunity to obtain an automatic stay of assets is also a determinant of 
how entrepreneurial-friendly the legislation is. The option of reorganization bankruptcy in 
national law illustrates policy makers‟ will to support its aspiring entrepreneurs meanwhile 
saving valuable jobs. However, an automatic stay on creditor‟s actions is often a prerequisite 
for a firm to be able to undergo reorganization bankruptcy and not end up liquidated.  
Exemption levels acts as insurance for entrepreneurs as it provides a “cushion” against deep 
personal consequences in the event of bankruptcy (White 2007). As mentioned, previous 
research has shown that states having high exemption levels, i.e. focus on protecting the 
insolvent entrepreneur, produce higher levels of self-employed workers in the population.  
The total effects of a more lenient bankruptcy law may affect entrepreneurship along at least 
two dimensions. First, through the lowering of ex-post costs for the honest entrepreneur by 
allowing him to make a fresh start by walking out on firm debt, as described above. 
However, it is likely that a more forgiving bankruptcy regulation will not only stimulate 
entry by marginal entrepreneurs, but also encourage creditors to tighten credit access for 
small start-ups as a direct result of poorer creditor rights supported in the law. Accordingly, 
the trade off between access to company credit and the severity of bankruptcy law comes 
into play and the net effect is not conclusive. Nevertheless, this thesis expect that the net 
effect of a change in national bankruptcy regulation to allow for either automatic stay or 
discharge, or both, as well as higher exemption levels have a positive impact on 
entrepreneurship rates. 
 
5.1.2 Bankruptcy rates 
Bankruptcy rates act as a proxy for the level of business churn in a country. Meaning, one 
could expect a positive relationship between increasing bankruptcy rates and entry of new 
companies in the economy. The churning effect displays the efficiency of a given economy 
and the role of bankruptcy rates are not to be underestimated in this respect. The “Getting up 
is in our nature”-paper from the EU states; “It is impossible to rescue every enterprise, but 
today‟s failure frequently holds the germ of tomorrow‟s success” (European Commission 
2009). However, higher bankruptcy rates is often also a indication of a weakening economy 
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as has been a common feature world wide in the face of the recent credit crunch. There is a 
natural correlation between business cycles and the number of insolvencies, and increasing 
bankruptcy rates are often seen as a sign of an economy where financing for small startups is 
hard to generate.  In other words, bankruptcy rates provide both incentives and disincentives 
for increased entrepreneurship. I believe the latter effect to be the strongest.  
 
5.1.3 Fear of failure 
A variable concerning the stigma from failure indicate whether the national culture is 
forgiving towards its failed entrepreneurs or if even the honest bankrupts are prevented from 
starting over. Even though the concept of stigma is undeniably connected to current 
bankruptcy law, it is often referred to as more of an attitude towards business failure, and is 
thus very hard to measure across countries. However, an individual‟s fear of failure 
concerned with starting a business may act as a proxy for how the person perceives the social 
stigma in the case of closure and whether or not he observes that bankrupt entrepreneurs get 
a second chance in society. Information on the public attitude towards bankruptcy can be 
used to analyze the legal and social consequences of insolvency. OECD-researchers puts it 
this way; “Significant differences in entrepreneurial attitudes can exist among countries, and 
there is evidence that cultural characteristics have an impact on entrepreneurial activity” 
(OECD 2004). A higher degree of fear of failure on a national level is expected to have a 
negative effect on entrepreneurship rates. 
 
5.1.4 The cost of bankruptcy 
The costs associated with bankruptcy proceedings is a measure of how effective the 
insolvency institutions perform, both according to the aspects of speed and efficiency, and 
the recovery rates of the bankrupt estate.  National regulations vary significantly in both time 
consumption and cost efficiency, which in turn is a vital aspect concerning unsecured 
creditor‟s recovery rates. An inefficient bankruptcy law may have serious spillover effects to 
the financial market, making it harder for entrepreneurs to attain credit due to perceived 
higher risks on the shoulders of the unsecured creditors. A more cost effective bankruptcy 
law has an estimated positive effect on enterprise start up rates.  
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This thesis will separately consider the variables mentioned above in the statistical analysis 
described in the following chapters.   
5.2 Other factors affecting entrepreneurship 
We have in the chapters above looked thoroughly at the intuitive link between how 
bankruptcy regulation might affect entrepreneurship. However, national levels of 
entrepreneurship might be influenced by a wide range of additional factors as well. To be 
able to develop a better understanding of all the drivers of entrepreneurship, we need to 
control for a range of other well selected legal and economic factors. The thesis wants to 
look at how they may affect the national levels of new start-ups and stimulate 
entrepreneurship performance. The variables included in the model are explained in the 
following. 
 
5.2.1 GDP growth 
The level of economic development, as measured by GDP growth, gives an indication of the 
level of opportunities available in a country at a particular time. GDP growth has been 
known to display a positive relationship with enterprise creation as it accurately reflects the 
capital conditions for new start ups. Eurostat (2003) found a close relationship between the 
level of economic growth and enterprise birth rates, as high levels of GDP were often found 
in connection with high start up rates. This relationship indicate that high GDP levels 
contribute to increasingly beneficial conditions for entrepreneurs, such as improved ease of 
capital access, high human capital and developed technological and geographic 
infrastructure. Hence, GDP growth as an explanation variable might account for the effect of 
favorable or unfavorable economic cycles on start up rates. 
The link between GDP growth and bankruptcy legislation has become apparent in the recent 
economic boom where rising income on national levels spurred the desire to grow faster by 
favoring a more lenient bankruptcy law and thereby encourage entrepreneurship. A 
supporting example of this is the, as mentioned, UK bankruptcy law-revision in the 
Enterprise Act of 2004, where Britain reduced its time to discharge for exactly the reasons 
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stated above. The total effect of GDP growth is therefore expected to positively affect 
entrepreneurship rates.  
 
5.2.2 Unemployment 
There might be numerous factors driving individuals to become self-employed. 
Determinants often mentioned as the most decisive motivations for becoming an 
entrepreneur include expectations of increased profits, a sense of independence and 
achievement, status and responsibility (Eurostat, 2003). It is also argued that high levels of 
unemployment might act as an incentive for firm creation, because self-employment may be 
seen as an alternative to unemployment. The foundation of this deduction is that an 
individual‟s unfruitful struggle to find a job might push him into self-employment and start 
his own firm, potentially with the help of support schemes and training programs.  
OECD analyses find that the self-employment rate across countries is related to a range of 
explanatory variables, including unemployment rates. However, the Eurostat-study of 2003 
finds a negative relationship between unemployment rates and business birth rates across the 
EU. Meaning, higher levels of unemployment did not seem to push or attract jobless 
individuals to taking the risk of starting their own company. Still, it is worth mentioning that 
this conclusion is based upon a limited set of data, and thus it is very interesting to see if our 
thesis reaches the same conclusion.  
High unemployment might be a sign of a weak economy with limited access to financial 
funding for aspiring entrepreneurs, and thus it may be a contributor of lower levels of 
entrepreneurship. However, unemployment might as mentioned also push out of work-
individuals to start a new enterprise, thus contributing to increased national start up rates. In 
this thesis I assume the latter effect to be the strongest.  
 
5.2.3 Education 
The productivity-enhancing role of human capital has received renewed attention over the 
last years due to the vital correlation between technological innovations and business labor‟s 
know-how and expertise. The interaction of human and physical capital in innovative 
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ventures is perhaps the most essential cause of MFP growth in recent years. As stated by the 
OECD Growth Study of 2002, “For ICT to be developed and used effectively, and network 
externalities of new technology to materialize, the right skills and competency must be in 
place”. In this regard tertiary educational attainment in a given country may reflect the 
quality of labor. In addition, higher educational levels may act as a proxy for entrepreneurial 
education due to the fact that more entrepreneurship classes are performed at this level as 
opposed to lower educational stages.  
Ideally, I would have liked to directly measure the level of entrepreneurship education which 
may better capture the complete effect of entrepreneurial policy on start up rates. However, 
due to less accessible data for all countries in the sample and a shorter time horizon, a 
measure of the population with higher educational achievements is used instead. As 
mentioned, there is increasing levels of entrepreneurship programs at higher levels of 
education. The “Survey on entrepreneurship in higher education in the EU” found that circa 
47% of students at the higher-education institutions in Europe have access to 
entrepreneurship education (FORA 2008); meaning that half of the European students with 
tertiary education attainment have or had the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurship 
programs during their studies. Accordingly, the degree of tertiary educational attainment in a 
country may serve as an appropriate measure for the quality of labor skills, and thereby the 
probability that the population have the knowledge to produce technological innovations of 
importance on a national level. This thesis expects a positive net effect of higher educational 
attainment on enterprise start up rates.  
 
5.2.4 Patent applications 
Numbers on patent applications are included to account for the idea generation in a society. 
Patent applications can be seen as an early investment in new technologies and more 
efficient processes of utilizing existing resources. Therefore, the effect of increased patent 
applications in a given country is expected to have a positive effect on entry rates of new 
companies with new inventions. However, patent applications filed at the EPO may also 
have a negative effect on entrepreneurship rates in a given country as an approved patent 
application petitioned at EPO makes it binding in the entire EU area as well as in Norway for 
the same cost. Previously patent applicants had to separately apply for patent protection in 
each country, often resulting in many countries being left out, and consequently many partly 
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patent protected inventions were utilized by other than their inventors. The ethics of this may 
be debatable and the EPO-procedure has undoubtedly simplified the process of ensuring 
patent protection across the EU area, but may not have ensured exclusively positive stimulus 
on the idea generation process. 
 
5.2.5 Legal origin 
In a famous study from 1998, La Porta et al. showed that the origin of corporate law is of 
importance to the ﬁnancial development, as a result of legal traditions affecting the 
efficiency with which economies adjust to legal revisions and evolving economic conditions. 
National differences within legal systems may be used as a proxy for the effect of 
introducing a new bankruptcy regulation.  
As a country‟s institutional features, including its creditor rights, legal heritage and judicial 
system may affect the efficiency of the bankruptcy regulation; it may consequently influence 
aggregate business start up rates. This thesis wish to explore in more detail how the origin of 
corporate law influences bankruptcy legislation. Four different legal origins are identified, 
the English common law and the French civil law, as well as the German and Scandinavian 
civil law.  
 
5.2.6 GEM variables 
The GEM-variables include indexes on future entrepreneur and know entrepreneur as well 
as the potential entrepreneur index. The future entrepreneur index is defined as the share of 
people of the adult population
13
 who expects to start a business within three years. The 
potential entrepreneur variable indicates the share of the adult population who believe they 
have the required skills and knowledge for setting up a business, but who have not yet done 
so. This index may in this regard act as a proxy for the level of informal entrepreneurial 
education. Know entrepreneur index is defined as the share of population that personally 
knows someone who started a business in the past two years. This index may indicate the 
possible effects of mentors or of being part of a cluster or innovative networks. The expected 
                                                   
13
 Adult population is characterized as individuals between 18 and 64 years of age. 
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effect of an increase in the know entrepreneur index is expected to increase entry rates as 
aspiring entrepreneurs then have a potential mentor to guide them on their way. In addition, 
a higher percentage of future and potential entrepreneurs in a society clearly should 
contribute to higher start up rates.  
 
5.2.7 Omitted variables 
Other variables, such as campaigns to promote entrepreneurship, broadband subscribers, 
incorporation costs, as well as the presence and growth of industrial clusters and incubators 
were also considered. However, due to lack of suitable and measurable data, I cannot 
analyze the effect of these variables as promoters of entrepreneurship.  
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6. Data 
In this section I first reintroduce the hypothesis and explain the reasons for choosing the 
present country sample. I then provide a description of the thesis‟ unique dataset, its sources 
and the collection process. Further, I present the data in more detail using descriptive 
statistics. For the latter see Table 1 of Appendix A.  
6.1 Hypothesis 
This thesis use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as fixed and random effects 
estimation to explore how a forgiving bankruptcy law can encourage and stimulate 
entrepreneurship in a society. Initial work has led to the question to be addressed, also 
mentioned in chapter 3:   
How do the characteristics of national bankruptcy-regulation affect the level of 
entrepreneurship in a society?  
The hypothesis is that, all other things being equal, the stricter the bankruptcy-regulation the 
less entrepreneurship there will be in a society. More forgiving bankruptcy legislation will 
allow the debtor to make a fresh start, the downside risk of self-employment will be reduced, 
thus encouraging business start ups and increasing levels of entrepreneurship on a national 
level.  
6.2 Country sample 
I investigate the
 
relationship between bankruptcy laws and entrepreneurship using
 
data on the 
annual start-up rates over 13 years from 1995 to 2007, focusing on the following countries: 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.  
I have selected my primary focus to be on OECD-countries as a result of the similarities 
between these countries. GEM research has shown that the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic development differs along the phases of economic 
development (GEM 2008). For high-income countries, obstacles to entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities are less decisive. Income levels have a large influence on 
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entrepreneurial and innovative activities (Mittelstädt and Cerri 2009). There is a capital 
shortage in low-income countries reflected in both higher real interest rates and stricter 
demand for security. This hits newly started SMEs more than just, resulting in a stifling of 
truly innovative initiatives. Also, the economic systems, education levels and policy 
objectives in countries outside OECD differ widely and make comparisons with European 
and North American-countries difficult. 
The country sample of this study counts thirteen nationalities and displays a rich diversity. 
We find differences concerning start up rates, bankruptcy levels, unemployment, cultural 
aspects, resources, population size and GDP per capita, to name a few. As an example, 
France and Germany are large countries which today have some of Europe‟s lowest 
entrepreneurial levels, both struggle with high unemployment and slow growth in 
productivity. At the other end is the US with the world‟s highest levels of business start-ups 
and multi factor productivity (MFP), as well as substantially lower unemployment rates
14
. In 
spite of this diversity in the underlying framework, entrepreneurship is an important policy 
concern for all of the countries studied. The results of this study allow for a comparison of 
the entrepreneurial situation in Europe and North America useful for policymakers when 
shaping tomorrow‟s insolvency proceedings.  
6.3 Data description 
To be able to explain the central relationship investigated in this thesis, I make use of a 
substantial and unique dataset where several variables are included over a relatively long 
time horizon. The main sources for the various explanation variables are all described below. 
A more detailed overview of the sources and description of data can be found in Table1. 
Outline of the bankruptcy characteristics across countries can be found in Appendix B. Table 
2 presents the summary statistics with mean and standard deviations of each variable in each 
country. In addition, figures showing the development of entry rates, bankruptcy rates and 
unemployment rates across countries are presented in Appendix C. 
 
                                                   
14
 That is, at least before the recent financial crisis. Nearly all data material in this thesis is from the period before the recent crisis hit the 
global economy. 
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6.3.1 Business demography 
Collection of data has been a very challenging process. Countless hours have been spent 
searching national statistical agencies and other sources for reliable information on business 
demography as well as bankruptcy law characteristics. I am very grateful for all the help I 
have gotten, especially from the German, Canadian, Swedish and Norwegian statistical 
agencies. However, systematic measurement of national data needed to perform accurate 
cross-country comparisons is imperfect due to the lack concerning harmonization of 
concepts and registration requirements. This is mainly due to changes in the underlying 
national measurement systems and/or differences in the country‟s categorization of the 
measures.  
Even though this paper utilizes possibly the most concrete concept of entrepreneurship 
available – the number of new businesses registered annually as a share of total active 
companies in an economy, instead of the vaguer notion of an attitude towards 
entrepreneurship; national data has been difficult to compare across countries. As an 
example, the U.S. only measures start-ups from April to April and do not produce any yearly 
data. As a result, these numbers cannot be compared to the other countries in my sample. 
The harmonization problem is also recognized by Audretsch and Thurik (OECD 2000b); “It 
is widely acknowledged that measuring entrepreneurship is a difficult task, given the 
limitations of measurement instruments” (Golden et al. 2003).   
The EU has also identified the lack of harmonized data collection methods nationally and is 
now through Eurostat working with OECD to produce guidelines to ensure “a common 
methodological framework for business demography statistics that maximizes their 
international comparability and relevance” (Bosma et al. 2005). 
As a result of the lack of harmonization across countries when it comes to methods of 
collection, I have unfortunately not been able to collect complete and comparable datasets 
from national statistical agencies for the entire period of interest. In consequence I have had 
to rely on international statistical agencies, such as the statistical bureau of Enterprise 
Information Management‟s Business & Policy Research (EIM BR). This thesis‟ business 
demography data is therefore primarily compiled from EIM in respect to the relatively long 
time horizon chosen as foundation in this thesis. Nearly all of the countries in my data 
sample were included in the EIM data material, with the exception of Canada, Norway and 
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Sweden. For the latter three countries I supplement with reliable entry and bankruptcy data 
from national statistical agencies.  
The disadvantage of using EIM as data provider is that one loses detailed information related 
to where in a particular country the company is starting up and what type of business it is 
conducting. Thereby, analysis investigating these aspects will be impossible.  
Despite the challenges when it came to data collection, the business demography data 
obtained in this thesis seem to give a precise picture of the entrepreneurial new starters in 
each country surveyed as it clearly follows the economic cycles and underlying framework 
conditions such as changing legal requirements. 
For the formal description of business demography variables; an enterprise birth, i.e. the 
formation of a new company, is in this study specified as the establishment of a set of 
production factors where no other companies are directly or indirectly included in the 
foundation. The amount of enterprise births do not involve business entries due to such 
events as mergers, firm break-ups, change of activity or restructuring of a set of companies. 
To be able to compare the entrepreneurial new starters across countries I have made use of 
the number of new start ups as a percentage of the total active business population in each 
country. The start up rate represent a way to compare and evaluate the entrepreneurial rates 
between countries, which is presented in figures in Appendix C.  
The bankruptcy rate is classified as the number of unincorporated and corporate business 
bankruptcies divided by the number of active companies in a country‟s economy. The 
development of country bankruptcy levels is also graphically presented in Appendix C.  
 
6.3.2 Repayment period, automatic stay and exemption levels 
Data on legal rights to receive an automatic stay on assets in reorganization bankruptcy as 
well as exemption levels and the possibility of discharge of outstanding debt after liquidation 
is compiled from various sources on national level as well as EU level. The Doing Business 
project of the World Bank provided valuable information on the legal basis concerned with 
bankruptcy regulation. The European Judicial Network of the European Commission, found 
at EUROPA - the portal site of the European Union, has provided much information on 
bankruptcy regulation within the member states. In addition, the Norwegian institution for 
information on bankruptcies, Konkursrådet, and the law division at the Justice Department 
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has been of great help regarding information on the Scandinavian bankruptcy regulation. 
Articles of special importance include Armour and Cumming (2008) and White (2007). 
National bankruptcy regulation for each country in my sample receives extended review in 
Appendix B of this paper.  
 
6.3.3 Education 
Data on tertiary education attainment across countries are from the Statline databank at the 
Central Bureau for Statistics in the Netherlands. An international comparison of investment 
climate, human capital and labor supply provide a complete database consisting of the 
number of people in the 25 to 65 age bracket who has graduated higher educational levels in 
all countries surveyed in this thesis. Tertiary education is in the U.S. characterized as the 
educational level following high school or any education of equal status. For European 
countries this typically involves education at bachelor, masters or PhD-levels.
15
  
 
6.3.4 GDP growth  
Statistics regarding growth in gross domestic product for all countries is compiled from the 
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 Edition, as presented by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The yearly growth is measured as an annual percent change in GDP 
in constant prices of the national currency, thereby accounting for the effect of inflation.  
 
6.3.5 Unemployment 
The source of standardized unemployment rates is the OECD Main Economic Indicators as 
presented in the Economic Outlook of December No. 84. - Volume 2008. Unemployment 
rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force. The labor force is the 
total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons 
aged 15 to 74 who were: i) without work during the reference week, ii) currently available 
                                                   
15
 According to the ISCED97 classification, ISCED standing for International Standard Classification of Education, some other forms of 
education also count as higher education.  
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for work, iii) actively seeking work. OECD states that the data has, as far as possible, been 
adjusted to ensure comparability over time and to conform to the guidelines of the 
International Labor Office. In countries with annual surveys, monthly estimates are obtained 
by extrapolation and by incorporating trends in administrative data, where available. The 
annual figures are then calculated by averaging the monthly estimates. For countries with 
monthly or quarterly surveys, the annual estimates are obtained by averaging the monthly or 
quarterly estimates, respectively. 
 
6.3.6 Patent applications 
The variable on patent applications received at the European Patent Office (EPO) is 
collected by Eurostat for the Innovation and Research program. The variable covers patent 
applications from all sectors of industry, and represents patent applications per million of the 
working population.  
  
6.3.7 Legal origin 
The classification of the sample countries‟ legal origin is collected from the work done by La 
Porta et al. (1998). Their results show that common law countries generally have the 
strongest creditor protection and hence stricter bankruptcy regulation on the debtor, whilst 
French civil law has the weakest legal protection of creditors. The German and Scandinavian 
civil law countries are found to be located in the middle. Within this data material, the 
common law is found in the United Kingdom, United States, Ireland and Canada. The 
French civil code is found in the Netherlands, Italy, France and Belgium. The German civil 
law is in this data sample only found for Germany itself. The Scandinavian civil code is on 
the other hand very well represented in four of the sample countries; Sweden, Norway, 
Finland and Denmark.  
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6.3.8 Attitudes toward entrepreneurship and fear of failure 
All variables are compiled from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database, 
covering Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA), Future entrepreneur index, Know 
entrepreneur index, Potential entrepreneur index and Fear of failure index. As mentioned in 
the introduction, GEM is a series of annual studies concerned with improving our 
understanding of the relationships between entrepreneurship and national development.  
The GEM Adult Population Survey provides micro level data of the participating countries. 
Representative samples of at least 2,000 individuals in the adult population are annually 
drawn for every country. Questionnaires are completed by key-informants in the field of 
entrepreneurship within all countries, and aggregates are derived from the individual data.  
Unfortunately, the GEM-project did not publish its current range of variables until 2002. In 
other words, data on the share of a country‟s population who is currently setting up a 
business, or expects to start a business within three years; who knows an entrepreneur, or 
who see themselves as potential entrepreneurs; as well as the share of population who 
indicate that fear of failure prevent them from starting a business; is only available for the 
time period between 2002 and 2008. However, some countries in the sample were not 
involved in the projects of 2007 and 2008. Consequently, I only have data for Canada until 
2006, for Germany data from 2007 is excluded, and Sweden lack data for 2008. This is of 
course a disadvantage, and is the reason why these variables only take part in the extended 
model in Table 4.  
 
6.3.9 The cost of bankruptcy 
The World Bank‟s Doing Business project measures international differences in business 
regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies. The topic of “Closing a Business” 
identifies weaknesses in existing bankruptcy law and the main procedural and administrative 
bottlenecks in the bankruptcy process. The cost associated with bankruptcy proceedings is 
measured as part of this index. The cost is calculated as a percentage of the total assets in the 
bankruptcy estate.  
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7. Methodology and model specification 
In this section I present the methodology and model specification employed to solve the 
problem at hand. I go through different types of methods to estimate panel data and explain 
why the methodology chosen will gain the best result. Further, in the model specification I 
include variables linked to a nation‟s bankruptcy law as well as other selected variables 
capable of affecting start up conditions. The thesis will also focus on the contribution recent 
economic crisis has made and explore whether bankruptcy regulation‟s legal origin has 
significant effect on the level of new businesses within a nation. Additional analysis linked 
to the data material gathered by GEM will also be performed to broaden the perspective of 
the thesis. GEM started gathering data quite recently and the earliest observation registered 
is for the year 2002. As mentioned, this indicate a considerable cut down from the time 
horizon present in the data material originally gathered for this thesis; GEM-data is thus not 
utilized in the main model. 
7.1 The econometric technique of panel data analysis 
The dataset applied in this thesis is in the form of panel data, also named longtitudal data as 
a result of it containing observations on multiple variables over several time periods. This 
type of data has both a cross-sectional dimension represented by the differences between 
countries, and a time-series dimension reflected in changes within countries over time. Panel 
data therefore allows us to follow the same group of countries over a chosen time period, 
enabling us to study the dynamics of the group‟s development. Thus, panel data sets are 
often used in the analysis of government policy changes, such as modifications of 
bankruptcy regulation.  
The main advantage of cross-country panel data for the analysis of business entry rates is 
that the country-specific effects can be controlled for by using either a fixed or random 
effects estimator. This is especially useful when working with this type of data as 
observations are often not independently distributed over time (Wooldridge 2006). For a 
country, unobserved (and often immeasurable) variables, such as culture, may affect 
business start up rates over time. It is also possible to use regular multiple regression 
techniques on panel data. This technique however has some drawbacks which will be 
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described below.  
 
7.1.1 Multipple regression technique 
Even though multiple regressions, such as pooled OLS, are possible to use when working 
with panel data, this technique may not produce fully optimal results. Coefficient estimates 
obtained from multiple regressions may be subject to omitted variable bias and as a result 
lead to inconsistent estimates. This type of bias occurs when the dependent variable is 
correlated with some unknown variable that cannot be controlled for (Princeton University 
2009). Of course it may be possible to try to control for more explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis to reduce the probability of omitted variable bias. But as mentioned, 
many such unobserved factors may be hard to measure.  
To get unbiased results when estimating a panel data model using pooled OLS, we have to 
make an assumption that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the unobserved 
effect captured in the error term. Often we cannot be sure if this is the case or not. However, 
instead of multiple regression technique one might chose to use panel data techniques which 
allow for control of some types of omitted variables even without observing them. As 
mentioned, country-specific effects affecting our analysis can be controlled for by using 
either a fixed or random effects estimator. Both methods are included in this thesis.  
 
7.1.2 Fixed effects 
In general, there exists two types of unobserved factors affecting the explained variable; 
these are constant variables and time-varying factors. The fixed effects model will be 
presented in the following (all equations are based on Wooldridge 2006):  
(1)  
In the notation, i denote the countries in the sample, while t denotes year. The unobserved 
effect is represented by the variable αi which captures all unobserved factors affecting the 
dependent variable that do not change over time. αi is also referred to as the fixed effect as it 
is constant over time.  The idiosyncratic error term uit captures all unobserved factors that 
change over time and affect the dependent variable yit.  
 50 
 
The fixed effects regression lets us control for omitted variables that might differ between 
countries but which are fixed over time. In this analysis, omitted variables would be country 
unobserved effects that for some reason differ between countries, but at the same time are 
constant over time for the different countries. Examples include a country‟s culture for 
entrepreneurship as well as the population‟s risk aversion concerned with potential 
bankruptcy and its consequences.  
The fixed effects model allow for correlation between the unobserved fixed effects αi and the 
explanatory variables in any time period. To obtain this it is necessary to time demean each 
explanatory variable. For each country it we therefore average equation (1) over time:  
(2)  
As a consequence of αi being constant over time, it appears in both equation (1) and (2). 
Further procedure includes subtracting equation (2) from (1):  
(3) – – – – –  
As a result of ÿi =  yit – yi, the time-demeaned equation can for each country i be written as:  
(4)   
 
As we can see from (4) the fixed effect αi has disappeared. In other words, the fixed effects 
transformation has eliminated the unobserved constant effect. This allows for αi to be 
correlated with the explanatory variables in any time period (Wooldridge 2006). As a 
consequence, any explanatory variable that is fixed over time will be dropped from the 
model. Thus we cannot utilize the fixed effects model in the presence of amongst other legal 
origin dummies which naturally will stay constant from year to year.  
 
7.1.3 Random effects 
While the fixed effects estimation allow for omitted variables to vary between countries they 
need to be constant over time for the model to produce efficient estimates. However, what if 
the analysis is subject to unobserved effects which are not fixed over the time horizon, but 
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vary between countries? In cases where it is reasonable to assume that αi is uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, it will be possible to use the random effects model. This model 
will as mentioned account for both types of omitted variables, while the fixed effects model 
only account for one type of omitted variables. Stata‟s random effects estimator is a 
weighted average of within and between effects; meaning that while the fixed effect 
estimator only utilizes time variation within each cross-sectional observation, the random 
effects estimator also utilizes variation between observations (Princeton University 2009). 
We may start to derive the random effects model with basis in the unobserved effects model 
presented in equation (1): 
(5)  
 
Note that an intercept β0 is added to the equation. This is to allow for the assumption that αi 
has a zero mean. Thus we can assume that the unobserved variable αi is uncorrelated with 
and independent of all explanatory variables over the entire time period.  
Accordingly, equation (5) above becomes the random effects model when we assume no 
correlation between αi and xit. 
(6)  
 
Where we define the composite error term as νit = αi + uit. If the unobserved effects vary 
between countries and over time, the composite error term νit will be serially correlated 
across the time horizon (Wooldridge 2006). The use of regular multiple regression 
techniques on such a data set would lead to incorrect results. The random effects model on 
the other hand, utilizes a GLS (generalized least squares) transformation which eliminates 
serial correlation in the error term. Wooldridge (2006) explains, “Random effects are 
preferred to pooled OLS because random effects are generally more efficient.”  
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7.1.4 Fixed versus random effects 
Fixed effects is often characterized as the main model for analysis on panel data (Princeton 
University 2009). This is because it allows for correlation between αi and xit, while the 
random effects model does not. Fixed effects estimation is always a wise thing to perform 
whilst working with panel data. However, if we believe that the unobserved effects are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables in our analysis, then the random effects model will 
be able to produce more efficient estimates than the fixed effects model. The fixed effects 
estimator subtract the entire time average from the variables, while the random effects 
estimator utilizes the between differences as well. In other words, the random effects 
estimator also utilizes the information on the distance between the groups, making it a more 
efficient estimator.  
To help us chose between these two models, it is possible to run a Hausman test which has 
been constructed to formally test for statistically significant differences in the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables in the two different models. The null hypothesis of the test is that 
the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are the same as those estimated by 
the fixed effects estimator. A failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that both the fixed 
and random effects estimates are sufficiently similar, consequently it does not matter which 
model is used. A significant p-value on the other hand, means that only the fixed effects 
model will be able to produce efficient coefficients. The Hausman test will be performed in 
this thesis where it is appropriate.  
 
7.2 Model spesification 
Based on the above framework I estimate the contribution of bankruptcy law on 
entrepreneurship rates and thereby aggregated growth. Entry rates are measured as the level 
of startups relative to the total number of active businesses in a country.  I distinguish 
between the effects of repayment period, automatic stay and exemption levels to illustrate 
the broadness of bankruptcy regulation and thereby its potentially wide-ranging implications 
on start ups. Bankruptcy rates as an indicator of economies efficiency and business churn is 
also measured. In addition, I consider the effect of key variables as business cycle effects, 
employment, education levels and registration of inventions.  
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This arrangement of variables gives the following main model:  
ENTRYRATEit = β0 + β1DISHARGEYEARS + β2 AUTOMATICSTAY + 
β3EXEMPTIONS + β4BANKRUPTCYRATES + β5GDPGROWTH + 
β6UNEMPLOYMENT + β7EDUCATION + β8PATENTAPPLICATIONS + vit 
The specified model above is also the basis for an extended model including several dummy 
variables which explore the effects of recent global economic crisis and whether the legal 
origin of bankruptcy law affects start up rates across countries. As some of these variables 
are constant over time I am not able to utilize the fixed effects estimator in the extended 
model. Further analysis will be performed on data material gathered by GEM to be able to 
broaden the perspective of the thesis. This model also serves as a robustness check for the 
most recent years of the sample, in which we may investigate the effect of an extended 
amount of variables linked to bankruptcy law.  
All independent variables are presented in Table 3 of cross-country correlations. This is done 
to investigate if the data material suffers from multicollinearity as a result of either two or 
more highly correlated explanatory variables. Multicollinearity may lead to substantially 
larger standard errors, thereby distorting the regression results.  
The multiple regression results are summarized in Table 4, where nine model-estimations are 
specified. Results are presented and interpreted in closer detail in the next chapter.  
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8. Results and interpretation 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relative importance of cross-country bankruptcy 
regulation of assumed importance to the aspiring entrepreneur, to see if these legal 
characteristics affect the level of businesses starting up across countries. By conducting an 
empirical study on this subject I may identify if bankruptcy need to be a focus area of future 
policy changes in the OECD. 
In this chapter I will present results from the thesis‟ empirical research. Initially I will report 
the findings from the various models; the main and extended variable model as well as the 
model utilizing GEM data. Estimation of these models is done by using the techniques of 
ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects estimation. I discuss the 
interpretation of the various coefficients and then provide an overview of the result‟s 
implication and its economical significance. Finally, directions for further research are 
presented. Detailed results concerning this empirical research are found in Table 4. In 
addition, Table 2 shows summary statistics including mean and standard deviation for all 
countries in the sample, whilst Table 1 provides an overview of variable descriptions. Cross-
country correlation are presented in Table 3.  
 
8.1 Presentation of results 
Every model in this analysis is estimated with some form of entry rate as dependent variable. 
The main model as well as the extended dummy variable model both uses the EIM entry rate 
as dependent variable, while the GEM-model bases its analysis on a similar variable named 
total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA). Specifications of the main model always 
include the following variables; bankruptcy rates, repayment years, automatic stay, 
exemptions, GDP growth, unemployment rates, tertiary education levels, patent applications. 
Dummies on legal origin and year dummies will be added in the extended model. The GEM-
model will base its analysis primarily on GEM variables such as the fear of failure index. In 
addition, the variables linked to bankruptcy regimes are included to be able to perform a 
robustness check. 
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8.1.1 Results from the main model 
Results from the pooled OLS presented in Table 4, column (1) of the main model, show that 
the bankruptcy related variables; bankruptcy rate, repayment years, automatic stay and 
exemption levels all have the pre-estimated negative effect. In addition, bankruptcy rate and 
exemption levels are statistically significant at the 5% and 0.1% level, respectively. 
Indicating that lower exemption levels as well as higher bankruptcy rates contribute to less 
start-ups. As expected, GDP-growth show a highly significant positive effect on entry rates 
at the 0.1% level, holding all other independent variables constant. Unemployment rate on 
the other hand, displays a negative effect on entry rates, implying that the effect of shifting 
business cycles on employment is stronger than the tendency to become self-employed if a 
member of the work force were to lose his job.  However, this estimate is not statistically 
significant.  
Surprisingly, higher education levels in the population turn out to have a negative effect on 
start up rates. This is contrary to what was expected since common belief implies that more 
education will foster more entrepreneurship. Although this effect is not significant at any 
accepted level, reasons for this surprising effect will be presented in section 8.2. Patent 
applications also show a negative effect on entry rates. This effect is statistically significant 
at the 1% level, implying that more patent applications in a country have a negative effect on 
start up rates. This is a puzzling result and possible reasons for this will also be described 
later in this chapter. As mentioned in chapter 7, pooled OLS does not account for 
unobserved effects in the same way as the fixed and random effects estimations, and the 
estimated coefficients in column (1) may be inefficient as a result of being subject to omitted 
variable bias as previously described. 
The fixed effects estimation of the model is presented in column (2) of Table 4. As we can 
see, the effect of the bankruptcy rate has now become positive and gained more significance; 
meaning that the churning effect of an efficient bankruptcy regime has a positive impact on 
entrepreneurship rates. Holding all other variables constant, the variable on repayment years 
is still negative indicating that the longer an entrepreneur has to wait to be discharged from 
pre-bankruptcy debt, the fewer new establishments will be started in a given country. 
However, as this coefficient is not statistically significant we cannot deduct any conclusive 
assumptions. Automatic stay has become positive in the fixed effects estimation contrary to 
what was believed to happen. This effect indicates that a policy change making automatic 
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stay possible in reorganization bankruptcy will contribute negatively to the start up of new 
businesses in a country. This effect is not at all logical and I will try to put forward some 
reasons for this later in section 8.2 as well. The exemption levels-variable is of course 
dropped from the fixed effects model as it is characterized as a constant variable. The effect 
of GDP growth is still positive and the coefficient has not lost any of its statistical 
significance of 0.1%. Unemployment rates estimated in the fixed effects model also keep its 
negative effect and increase some in size. In addition, the variable has become statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Coefficients on tertiary education and patent applications still 
keep their unexpected negative values. 
The outcome of the random effects model is nearly identical to the fixed effects model when 
it comes to negative and positive effects as well as statistical significance. This is also shown 
by the Hausman test which fail to reject the null hypothesis of the coefficients estimated by 
the random effects estimator being the same as those estimated by the fixed effects 
estimator; thereby allowing both methods to be used. As the coefficient estimates in the 
random effects model are generally more efficient, this model will be the preferred 
specification. In the random effects model the coefficient on exemptions are once more 
included since the random effects model allow for constant variables. The variable is barely 
significant at a 10% level. In addition, the surprising effect of patent applications has 
increased its significance to the 0.1% level. 
 
 
8.1.2 Results from the dummy variable model 
The main model is in column (4) extended to include dummies on legal origin to see if the 
foundation of the bankruptcy regime provides any effect on cross-country start up rates. The 
coefficients are estimated using the random effects technique. As can be seen from Panel B 
of Table 4, the coefficient on bankruptcy rate is still positive at a 1% significance level. 
Automatic stay does not regain its negative effects and also exemption levels become 
positive in this random effects model. However none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant at any level. The change regarding the effect of exemption levels is not 
unexpected since exemptions may have both positive and negative impact on start up rates. 
This is a result of the trade off between the probability for an entrepreneur to go bankrupt 
and the creditor‟s conditions when providing finances to entrepreneurs. The variable on GDP 
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growth still contributes positively to the entry rate of new businesses. Coefficients regarding 
education, patent applications and unemployment rate still display negative effects on 
entrepreneurship. 
Inclusion of the legal origin variables for French, German and Scandinavian civil law lets us 
control for their effect as opposed to the English common law system. The effect of both 
French and Scandinavian civil law displays a negative contribution to entry rates where these 
legal systems are implemented, as opposed to the common law system which I use as base. 
Both variables on legal origin are significant at a 5% level. The negative effect of French and 
Scandinavian legal origin implies that English common law provides the most favorable 
legal basis for entrepreneurship of the three, amongst other through its favorable bankruptcy 
regulation. The effect of German civil law on the other hand, displays an unexpected positive 
effect whilst holding all independent variables constant, indicating that German law ensures 
more entrepreneurs than the common law system. When looking at the data it is nevertheless 
clear that Germany is the only country in this thesis‟ data sample which has this origin and I 
therefore suspect estimation problems making the effect of the coefficient non conclusive. 
The estimate is not very large or significant and its standard deviation is of course high. 
The analysis of Panel B, column (5) is extended from the main model to include the effect of 
the dot.com bust the global economy experienced around 1999 – 2000. To control for this 
effect I create a dummy for these two years and run a random effects estimation. The results 
show a negative effect of the bust on entry rates, but the coefficient is not significant at any 
level and it is not possible to draw any decisive conclusion in this regard. Nearly all other 
variables in the random effects model keep their positive or negative values, except 
exemptions, which again turn positive. 
To be able to investigate the time effect on entrepreneurship rates I generate year dummies 
for all years except the recently investigated bust years of 1999 and 2000.  The results are 
reported in column (6) of Table 4. The general development can be seen as a highly positive 
effect from 1994 to 1998 and again from 2002 until 2005 where many new establishments 
entered the market. The effects are seen in contrast to the entry rate of 1999/2000 which I 
accordingly use as base. The positive coefficients of years 1995 and 1996 are the largest in 
the entire period as well as being highly significant at the 1% level. This trend corresponds 
closely to the literature on the business development characterizing the years before the 
millennium as a stock market boom. The business world‟s acceptance of and high valuation 
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of many so called dot.com-companies gave aspiring entrepreneurs future prospects for 
making a potentially large profit on their entrepreneurial ventures. Year 2002 saw a small 
setback in amount of ventures starting up probably related to the then recent bust. The total 
effect is still positive, meaning that while holding all other effects constant, more companies 
started in 2002 relative to the 1999/2000 level. However, the effect is not significant.  
The years after 2002 until 2005 are all positive, showing the optimistic effect of the coming 
boom on entry rates. However, in 2006 we see a sharp decline in start-ups entering the 
markets. The coefficient is large and within in the 1% significance level. Intuitively this 
effect seems to be too soon to capture the consequences of the financial crisis, which did not 
become apparent until the Lehman Bros bankruptcy in September 2008. An alternative 
explanation may be the falling unemployment rates in the recent boom years, indicating that 
the population generally possesses a preference for employment and higher wages in good 
times rather than self-employment and a riskier job future. Unfortunately, I do not have 
enough data material to directly test the effect of the recent economic boom and the 
following downturn in the fall of 2008. 
Further, the extended year dummy model (6) shows that all bankruptcy related variables 
regain their negative values. Automatic stay is significant at a 5% level, while exemptions 
and bankruptcy rates proves statistical significance of 0.1%. Unemployment and patent 
applications both keep their negative values. Tertiary education finally becomes positive 
implying that higher educational levels within the population contribute to additional start-
ups. However, the effect is not significant and from the results of this analysis we cannot 
ascribe this variable any real value when it comes to entrepreneurship. GDP growth 
however, keeps its positive and highly significant effect on entry rates. 
 
 
8.1.3 Results from the GEM-model 
The GEM-model utilizes a different dependent variable than the above analysis. Total early-
stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is a measure collected by the organization Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and contains data on the number of people currently 
setting up a business or owning/managing a business existing up to 3.5 years; relative to the 
adult population 18-64 years. By using this dependent variable the concept of entry rate is 
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broadened by some degree, now also including those who are in the process of establishing a 
business and those who have been self-employed or managers of their own business for a 
couple of years. As such the inclusion of this analysis represents a robustness check in which 
we in addition to analyzing whether the cultural aspects of a community promote 
entrepreneurship, may investigate the most recent effects of the different bankruptcy 
variables. The time horizon of this model spans the years from 2002 until 2006. 
Results from the pooled OLS estimation is presented in column (7) of Table 4. The Future 
entrepreneur index shows an exceptionally large, positive and significant effect on entry 
rates. This effect is as expected since the variable is characterized as the share of people 
expecting to start a business within three years. The same outcome is also true for potential 
entrepreneur, which show a large and positive effect on entry rates, significant at the 1% 
level, holding all independent variables constant. The effect of this variable on entry rates 
was also expected as the potential entrepreneur coefficient indicates to what degree the adult 
population believes they have the abilities needed to become an entrepreneur. Meaning, a 
higher share of people believing they have the suited knowledge to start a company – the 
more people become self-employed. As such this variable may act as a proxy for the 
educational effect on entrepreneurship. As we saw in the main model the tertiary education 
level did not provide any sufficient evidence for this effect, however the population‟s bare 
belief of having the right know-how does matter. 
The know entrepreneur index is a measure of how many in the adult population who know 
an entrepreneur personally. This variable has also attained the expected positive effect on 
start up rates; however the coefficient is not significant at any level. The positive effect is 
somewhat smaller compared to the future and potential entrepreneur indexes, but the effect is 
still large in an isolated sense. This result strongly indicates that the influence of just 
knowing an entrepreneur and perhaps using this person as your mentor, is not as large as 
actually believing you have the skills for starting your own company and expecting to do so 
in just a few years. 
The coefficient on fear of failure provide as expected a highly negative effect, significant at 
the 5% level. The variable measures how many of the adult population who would avoid 
setting up their own business for fear of failure. Aspects concerned with the fear of failure-
variable may be linked to country specific cultural conditions, either supporting or 
preventing individuals from starting their own enterprise. This paper thereby shows that the 
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effect of an inhibiting culture is absolutely affecting the start up rates, within the OLS 
framework. Cost of estate also contribute negatively to the entry rates, implying that a less 
efficient bankruptcy regime contribute to reduced entrepreneurship overall. This is an 
important lesson for policy makers to be aware of. The effect is highly significant at the 
0.1% level. Most of the bankruptcy related variables; bankruptcy rate, automatic stay and 
exemption levels all have the pre-estimated negative effect. Automatic stay additionally 
provides a large and highly significant effect. Repayment years on the other hand, show a 
surprising positive effect significant at the 5% level. This may be due to the fact that many of 
the sample countries have for this period of time reduced their repayment periods to ensure a 
more entrepreneurial friendly business climate. However, the estimate should also capture 
the countries in this sample, which do not allow for automatic discharge and impose nearly 
life long repayment plans on their entrepreneurs. As such this effect is highly puzzling and 
discussions around possible reasons for this effect will be presented in the next section. 
The fixed effects estimation of the GEM-model is presented in column (8) showing that all 
variables have lost their significance. The indexes of future entrepreneur, as well as potential 
and know entrepreneur still show large and positive effects on the start up rate. In fact, the 
effect of potential entrepreneur has now surpassed the effect of future entrepreneur. The 
variables of automatic stay and exemption levels are both dropped from the fixed effects 
model due to their constant features in the period under display. Repayment years keep its 
surprising positive effect and in the fixed effects model also the coefficient on fear of failure 
unexpectedly become positive. Cost of estate and bankruptcy rates still keep their negative 
coefficients, indicating that an inefficient bankruptcy regime as well as more bankruptcies, 
often linked to a weakening economy, contribute negatively to start up rates. But as none of 
the coefficients are statistical significant we cannot deduct any real conclusion from this 
model. 
The results of the random effects model (9) show that some of the coefficients have become 
statistically significant again. This goes for the future entrepreneur and potential 
entrepreneur indexes, which effects are both large and significant at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Also the coefficient on automatic stay, which is yet again included in the model 
as a result of the random effects estimation allowing for constant variables, is significant at 
the 1% level. In addition, all bankruptcy related variables confirm their negative effects on 
entry rates in the random effects estimation. Meaning, all except repayment years, which is 
still strangely positive. Cost of estate and fear of failure both show strong negative effects on 
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entry rates, but neither is statistically significant. When conducting a Hausman test, and 
examining the similarities of the fixed and random effects estimations for the GEM-model, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis as the p-value is very high; and thereby we allow both 
fixed and random methods to be used. As the random estimation in general produce more 
efficient estimates, and as the coefficients of column (9) show more significant coefficients 
than column (8), the conclusion needs to be that the random effects estimation is a better 
model for the GEM-analysis in this regard. 
 
8.2 Closer interpretation of the analysis 
In the above section all results from the analysis is described and explained. The different 
methods of estimation, namely the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimation, 
produce quite different results. For the pooled OLS estimates to be able to account for 
concerns of failure to meet assumptions, such as heteroscedasticity, all multiple regressions 
are performed with a command making them robust. With the robust option, the point 
estimates of the coefficients are exactly the same as in ordinary OLS, but the standard errors 
are estimated using the Huber-White estimators thereby dealing with this concern (Princeton 
University 2009). However, as mentioned in chapter 7, there is a high possibility that the 
models estimated by pooled OLS are subject to omitted variable bias, leaving the estimates 
inconsistent. This type of bias occurs when the dependent variable is correlated with some 
unknown factor that cannot be controlled for. The question of importance thus read; is our 
dependent variable, entry rate, correlated with any unknown variable impossible to control 
for? 
This question is very hard to answer, and many times we simply do not know. Nevertheless, 
one solution might be to try to uncover any unobserved effect that may or may not be 
correlated with the level of entrepreneurship in a society.  
As mentioned previously in this thesis the idea of an entrepreneurial culture may constitute a 
great influence on the population‟s general willingness to take risks and establish a company. 
The culture underlying social interactions is one of the key foundations when it comes to 
entrepreneurship, and a factor that is very hard to measure. In effect, I have found an 
unobserved effect directly linked to the culture of a society. Of course, there may exist many 
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other unobserved effects, such as risk willingness, the quality of entrepreneurial projects and 
efficiency, but in the following we will focus on culture.  
As a result of the existence of these unobserved effects, which are possibly closely linked to 
the entry rate, we need to assume that the pooled OLS is subject to omitted variable bias and 
consequently provides inconsistent estimates. However, by utilizing panel data estimation 
techniques this bias may be accounted for. The next question therefore relates to whether or 
not the unobserved effects are fixed in time or not. As mentioned, the fixed effects 
transformation allows for omitted variables to vary between countries, but they need to be 
constant over time for the model to produce efficient estimates. On the other hand, through 
random effects estimation we may be able to control for both variation over time and across 
countries. So, what type of unobserved effects characterizes the entrepreneurial culture and 
the stigma effect?  
As a country‟s culture may indeed be very hard to alter, it is not implausible that the 
unobserved variable is fixed in time. However, as the time period of investigation in this 
thesis spans nearly half a generation, including several recent national changes in bankruptcy 
regime, it would be very surprising if the underlying culture had not changed somewhat in 
the process. Thus, it seems the random effects estimation will be able to produce the most 
efficient estimates. 
However, an important condition for using the random effects model is that there is no 
correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables in the model. Again, 
we cannot know for sure if this is the case or not. Through the Hausman-test we nevertheless 
found that both estimation techniques may be used for the main model as well as for the 
GEM-model, indicating that the random effects model is able to produce the best estimates 
in this regard. Even though the R
2
 should not be relied on exclusively, this goodness of fit-
estimate also indicate that the random effects estimations generate the most efficient 
variables as the overall R
2
-value is largest for both of the random effects-models when 
compared to the fixed effects estimations. 
In the models estimated above I have previously discovered some puzzling results. In this 
section I will try to discuss different reasons for why this might be. In the main model as 
well as in the extended dummy model, patent applications consistently contribute negatively 
to the entry rate. This is very surprising as more patents logically would mean more 
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inventions, and thereby more entrepreneurship. There may however be a rational explanation 
for this. Patent applications filed for through the European Patent Office may be enforced in 
any country member of the European Patent Organization. Conclusively a patent filed in 
Norway by a foreign individual may prevent Norwegian researchers from doing R&D within 
that particular field, thus inhibiting innovation. Other explanations include the fact that the 
quality of the data on patent applications is not good enough, or that there is no real link 
between the actual filing for patents and entrepreneurial work. Since many new inventions 
today are within the software area or within process development, which are both very hard 
inventions to patent, this latter explanation may reflect the real world in some sense. None 
the less, the true effect of the patent applications is impossible to interpret within the current 
data set. 
Tertiary education also showed a surprisingly negative effect in most of the models 
estimates. The reason for using this variable at all was because of its expected impact as a 
proxy for entrepreneurship education, which has only just recently begun to be measured. 
Most entrepreneurship classes are taught at higher levels of education indicating that the 
overall level of higher education in a population would reflect this. However, looking at the 
coefficient‟s direction it is clear that at best we have found no link between education and 
entrepreneurship within this data set.  
In the fixed and random effects estimation of the main model as well as in two of the 
estimates in the extended model, the coefficient on automatic stay unexpectedly turns 
positive. The effect is not significant for any positive values, but regains significance when it 
again turns negative as in model (6), (7) and (9). Still, this is not a reasonable effect as a unit 
increase in this regard provides no possibility for automatic stay in a reorganization 
bankruptcy. Explanations might be that on the one hand, entrepreneurs do not calculate that 
far ahead as to what their preferences would be if they ended in up in a reorganizational 
bankruptcy. Another explanation is that in countries that allow automatic stay, and thus 
impose fewer restrictions on the debtor, creditors need to make adjustments to be able to 
protect their own interests. As a result they prove debtors with stricter loan terms as well as 
higher interest rates, and as such prevent entrepreneurship. This may also be the case for the 
surprising effect of the repayment years in the above GEM-model. The trade off between 
creditors and debtors is highly affected by bankruptcy regimes – an effect not to take lightly. 
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8.3 Implications and economic significance 
Implications regarding this analysis include that it is not possible to make an unambiguous 
conclusion on the effect of national bankruptcy regulation on entrepreneurship rates. This 
thesis does not produce enough evidence to be able to do so. Consequently, it does not look 
as if bankruptcy law needs to be a focus area for future policy changes trying to promote 
entrepreneurship. The effects of in particular the variable concerning repayment years has in 
every model, with the expectance of the GEM-model, showed a negative effect on entry 
rates; implying that a longer payback period for entrepreneurs provide less startups in a 
society. However, this effect has not been statistically significant at any accepted level. The 
estimated coefficients on automatic stay have varied from positive to negative and back, thus 
providing little substantial evidence for its true effect. Its significant negative value in the 
GEM-model however might serve as a point of reference for further research concerning the 
implications of different reorganization bankruptcy regimes on entry rates.  
The coefficient on cost of bankruptcy in the GEM-model has consistently been negative in 
the analysis.  However, as shown above, it lost its significance when panel data techniques 
were utilized. Fear of failure has been one of the most interesting variables in this thesis as it 
may act as a proxy for the degree of stigma in a society. The coefficient estimate on fear of 
failure proved its expected negative effect in column (9), which I previously characterized as 
the best method of estimation for this model; but the estimated coefficient was not 
significant at any level. The exemption level has in every random and fixed effects model 
attained a negative value and also became highly significant in model (6), indicating that 
reduced exemption levels provide less entrepreneurship. Still, this is not enough to be able to 
statistically draw any final conclusion on the effect of these variables. 
The effect of bankruptcy rates have like automatic stay varied a lot in direction. However, 
both directions are defendable as bankruptcy rates may act as a proxy for business churn and 
thus the efficiency of an economy, as well as for the present strength of the economy. The 
only estimated variable that has proved its significant and undoubtedly positive effect on 
entry rates is GDP growth. This is natural since boom-years contribute both to wealthier and 
more risk willing investors, suppliers, partners and customers.  
Even though the estimation results above show no conclusive results regarding the real effect 
of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship, one should not underestimate the economic 
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significance of any country specific bankruptcy law. It is clear that numerous factors play 
important parts in making a productive environment for entrepreneurs. Many aspects of the 
trade off between the creditor‟s requirement for economic safety and predictability, and the 
entrepreneur‟s need for finances as well as personal safety cannot be properly examined 
purely in a statistical analysis. A more lenient bankruptcy regime may limit the 
entrepreneur‟s ability to borrow capital; however, as argued previously in this thesis, the 
implications of a harsh bankruptcy regulation may pose serious restrictions on the would-be 
serial entrepreneur, hindering him from starting another venture. If the bankruptcy regulation 
were to have no effect on the cross-country start up rates I believe we would have seen an 
entirely different distribution of where to find the most new ventures globally. Today, most 
new ventures are situated in the debtor-friendly U.S. All in all, the effects from this analysis 
may provide some hints of where the direction is going even if the total effect needs to be 
characterized as inconclusive. Lacking empirical results backing the hypothesis may be due 
to measurement error and further research within this field is highly recommended. 
 
8.4 Directions for further research  
Many aspects of national bankruptcy regulations are not possible to catch within the limited 
research frames of a master thesis, however, various features of the bankruptcy regime 
outlined in appendix B may be of vital importance to start up rates. As the entrepreneurial 
effects of the bankruptcy regime‟s strictness cannot be properly concluded on in this thesis, 
further research is needed to either establish a link between the two or discard it altogether. 
The need to investigate this relationship is important, as this thesis has shown that 
entrepreneurship is one of the most vital forces of economic growth today. 
Further research on this topic is however not feasible until comparable and harmonized data 
on business demography becomes available. As mentioned, this is a massive work in 
progress already established by Eurostat and OECD called “Entrepreneurship Indicators 
Project”.  
Until comparable data become available for cross-country business demography, several 
other aspects may be of interest for future research projects. Legal features, such as required 
minimum capital to form a corporation, could prove to have central impact on 
entrepreneurship. Also, the effects of learning by doing and entrepreneurial experience are 
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interesting topics concerning serial entrepreneurship. Another interesting extension is to look 
at entrepreneurship in different industries. Because different industries are inherently 
different in their riskiness, bankruptcy policy may prove to have shifting effects depending 
on the business‟ primary activities. 
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9. Conclusion 
This paper explores if and how bankruptcy law can encourage and stimulate 
entrepreneurship in a society. The thesis concentrates for the most part on the severity of 
bankruptcy legislation, focusing on whether a bankrupt debtor is being punished or forgiven 
in bankruptcy proceedings. Especially important in this regard are the length of the 
repayment period after personal bankruptcy, the possibility for automatic stay (moratorium) 
in reorganization bankruptcy and personal exemption levels. The analysis is based on a 
unique data set showing entry rates spanning the period of 1995 – 2007 from the following 
countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the U.S. 
The main finding of this paper is that variations in bankruptcy regimes across countries 
cannot provide us with any conclusive effect on the rate of start ups annually. The 
relationship between repayment years and entry rates is negative in most models, indicating 
that a longer repayment period contribute to less entrepreneurship, but the effect never 
become statistical significant. The various model coefficients on automatic stay have 
attained values which point in both directions, thus providing little substantial evidence for 
the true effect of moratorium in reorganizational bankruptcy. The exemption level has in 
most models attained a negative value and became highly significant in the extended time 
dummy model, indicating that reduced exemption levels provide less entrepreneurship. Still, 
this is not enough to be able to statistically draw any final conclusion on the effect of these 
variables on entry rates. In short, the thesis does not find evidence to support the hypothesis 
that bankruptcy regime directly and significantly affect the level of entrepreneurship in a 
country. 
However, it is clear that numerous factors play parts of vital importance for making a 
productive environment for entrepreneurs. As a high variety of determinants for 
entrepreneurship may be identified in a society, this thesis may not have been able to pick up 
all interactions between the different factors. However, one should be careful not to 
underestimate the economic significance of any country specific bankruptcy law. The 
thought of a strict bankruptcy regime having no effect on the amount of people wanting to 
take the risk of becoming self-employed is implausible, especially for the countries this 
thesis look at, where self-employment out of necessity is rare.  
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 A good insolvency regime must prevent entrepreneurs from taking irresponsible loans and 
lenders from giving loans with too high probability of default. The cost of pro-debtor 
bankruptcy procedures is less credit supply for small firms and at a higher rate. And even 
though no certain evidence exists within this thesis, the cost of a pro-creditor system may 
reduce the overall entrepreneurial activity at an aggregated level. The trade off between the 
small business owner and his creditors is of high importance and an area the government 
policy makers need to be aware of. All in all, the effects from this analysis may provide 
some hints of where the link between bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship is going even if 
the empirical evidence needs to be characterized as inconclusive.  
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Appendix A 
Table 1: Variable Description  
Variables  
and 
nationality  
Description  
 
Source 
 Entry rate  
 
Nationalities:  
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the 
Netherlands, 
United Kingdom,  
the U.S. 
 
New firm entries are 
characterized as new 
entrepreneurs who start a new 
company or existing 
companies/entrepreneurs who 
start a new company. 
 
Entry rate is thus defined as the 
number of new firm entries 
divided by the total number of 
companies in a certain country 
(%).  
EIM Business & Policy Research 
(EIM BV) 
 
http://data.ondernemerschap.nl/W
ebIntegraal/userif.aspx?SelectData
set=22&SelectSubset=66&Countr
y=UK  
Entry rate 
 
Nationality: 
Canada 
Business birth rate is identified 
as the real births of new firms 
that reflect actual entry into the 
Canadian economy (%).  
 
National Statistics Agency, 
Statistics Canada. 
 
www.statcan.gc.ca 
Entry rate  
 
Nationality: 
Norway 
Number of registered businesses 
which include sole entrepreneurs, 
unincorporated companies as 
well as corporations divided on 
the total amount of active 
companies (%). 
 
Business Registration Agency 
(Brønnsøysundsregisteret)  
 
 http://www.brreg.no/statistikk  
Entry rate 
 
Nationality: 
Sweden 
 
Number of registered businesses 
which include sole entrepreneurs, 
unincorporated companies as 
well as corporations divided on 
the total amount of active 
companies (%). 
 
National Statistics Agency 
(Statistisca Centralbyrån)  
 
http://www.scb.se/  
Bankruptcy rate  
 
Nationalities:  
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the 
Netherlands, 
Bankruptcy rate is defined as the 
number of bankruptcies, divided 
by the total number of companies 
in a certain country (%). 
 
EIM Business & Policy Research 
(EIM BV) 
 
http://data.ondernemerschap.nl/W
ebIntegraal/userif.aspx?SelectData
set=22&SelectSubset=66&Countr
y=UK 
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United Kingdom,  
the U.S. 
 
Bankruptcy rate  
 
Nationality: 
Canada 
 
Annual number of corporate and 
unincorporated business 
bankruptcies divided by the total 
amount of active businesses in 
Canada (%).  
 
Office of the Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy Canada,  
 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-
osb.nsf/eng/home 
Bankruptcy rate  
 
Nationality: 
Norway 
 
All business bankruptcies 
divided by number of active 
companies in the Norwegian 
economy (%).  
 
Business Registration Agency 
(Brønnsøysundsregisteret) 
 
http://www.brreg.no/statistikk 
Bankruptcy rate  
 
Nationality: 
Sweden 
 
Bankruptcy rate is defined as 
number of businesses bankrupt 
divided by total number of 
businesses in Sweden (%).  
 
National Statistics Agency 
(Statistisca Centralbyrån) 
 
http://www.scb.se/  
GDP growth 
 
 
Gross domestic product, annual 
percentage change in constant 
prices (%).  
 
International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2008.  
 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.asp
x 
 
Unemployment 
rate  
Standardized unemployment 
rates in percent of civilian labor 
force (%).  
 
OECD Economic Outlook: 
December No. 84 - Volume 2008 
Issue 2, OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. 
 
http://oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=2
960667/cl=18/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdst
ats/16081234/v195n1/s2/p1  
Tertiary 
education 
 
Tertiary education attainment of 
the population aged  
25 – 64 (%).  
 
CBS Statline Databank 
 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-
GB/menu/home/default.htm  
 
Patent 
applications 
 
Number of patent applications 
filed to the EPO all sectors of 
industry, per million of the 
working population. 
Eurostat 
 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/po
rtal/page/portal/structural_indicato
rs/indicators/innovation_and_resea
rch  
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Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the 
Commercial Code of each 
country.  
 
In this thesis legal origin takes 
the form of four dummy 
variables. Country values equal 1 
if the origin is English Common 
Law and 2 if it descends from 
French Commercial Code; 3 if it 
is founded in German 
Commercial Code and 4 if the 
country‟s legal origin is 
Scandinavian Civil Law. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
 
Cost of 
bankruptcy 
proceedings 
The cost of bankruptcy 
proceedings is calculated as how 
percentage of the total assets 
claimants (creditors, tax 
authorities, and employees) 
recover from an the bankruptcy 
estate (%). 
 
The World Bank Group, Doing 
Business project.  
 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
 
Total early-stage 
Entrepreneurial 
Activity Index 
(TEA) 
Number of people (in the adult 
population of 18 – 64 years) 
currently setting up a business or 
owning/managing a business 
existing up to 3.5 years (%).  
 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM). 
 
http://www.gemconsortium.org/ 
Future 
Entrepreneur 
Index 
 
Share of people (in the adult 
population of 18 – 64 years) 
expecting to start a business 
within three years. 
 
GEM 
Know 
Entrepreneur 
Index 
 
Share of people (in the adult 
population of 18 – 64 years) who 
personally know someone who 
started a business in the past two 
years. 
 
GEM  
Potential 
Entrepreneur 
Index 
 
 
Share of people (in the adult 
population of 18 – 64 years) 
indicating to have the required 
skills and knowledge for setting 
up a business themselves. 
 
GEM 
Fear of Failure 
Index 
Share of people (in the adult 
population of 18 – 64 years) that 
would abstain from setting up a 
business when they would sense 
GEM  
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a fear of failure. 
 
 
Repayment 
period  
The period of time a bankrupt 
entrepreneur is obligated to use 
future earnings to pay 
outstanding pre-bankruptcy debt. 
In other words, number of years 
until discharge is available.  
If discharge unavailable, value is 
set to be 30 years.  
 
Armour and Cumming (2008) 
 
White (2007) 
 
The European Judicial Network: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/ban
kruptcy/bankruptcy_gen_en.htm 
 
Country specific sources are 
outlined in the text of Appendix B. 
 
Automatic stay 
on assets  
 
Dummy variable indicating the 
possibility to obtain automatic 
stay on assets (moratorium) in 
reorganization bankruptcy. 
 
The dummy receives a value of 0 
if automatic stay is available, and 
1 if this is not available for the 
business management.  
  
La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Armour and Cumming (2008) 
 
White (2007) 
 
The European Judicial Network: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/ban
kruptcy/bankruptcy_gen_en.htm 
 
Country specific sources are 
outlined in the text of Appendix B. 
 
Exemption level Indicates the amount and value 
of the bankrupt individual‟s 
assets which may be exempt 
from the bankrupt estate.  
 
The dummy receives the value of 
0 if exemption levels are 
generous, 1 if the exemption 
levels only include certain 
personal assets necessary to 
obtain a decent way of life, and 2 
if the bankrupt estate may also 
include the spouse‟s assets.  
 
Armour and Cumming (2008) 
 
White (2007) 
 
The European Judicial Network: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/ban
kruptcy/bankruptcy_gen_en.htm 
 
Country specific sources are 
outlined in the text of Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table gives means and standard deviations of all variables in the dataset. 13 countries 
are included in the data over a period of thirteen years from 1995 to 2007. Entry rate is 
measured as number of new firm entries divided by the total number of companies in a 
certain country. Bankruptcy rate is defined as the number of bankruptcies, divided by total 
active companies. Both variables on business demography are given as percentage. GDP 
growth is given as annual percentage change in constant prices. The standardized 
unemployment rates are provided in percent of civilian labor force. Education is 
characterized as tertiary attainment of the population aged 25 – 64, in percentage. Patent 
applications measure the number of patents filed to the EPO, per million of the working 
population. TEA indicates how many of the adult population who is currently setting up a 
business or owning/managing a business existing up to 3.5 years, measured as a percentage. 
Future entrepreneur index represents the share of the adult population expecting to start a 
business within three years, know entrepreneur index measure the share of people who 
personally know someone who started a business in the past two years, whilst potential 
entrepreneur index give an overview of the adults indicating to have the required skills and 
knowledge for setting up a business themselves. The fear of failure index represents how 
many of the total population who would abstain from setting up a business if they sense a 
fear of failure. The cost of bankruptcy proceedings is calculated as a percentage of the total 
assets in the bankruptcy estate, while legal origin identifies each country‟s basis for the 
national commercial code.  
An overview of the summary statistics for the variables directly linked to bankruptcy regime; 
length of repayment period, the possibility for automatic stay in reorganization bankruptcy 
and exemption levels will be presented in a separate table in Appendix B. This appendix 
gives an extensive outline of the bankruptcy regulation for the countries included in our data 
sample.  
 
 Belgium Canada Denmark 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Entry rate    7.225000 0.619567 14.230770 0.819821 11.030770 1.546709 
Bankruptcy rate  1.266667 0.077849 1.043846 0.260017 0.853846 0.139136 
GDP growth 2.406133 1.138375 3.185133 1.323812 2.405333 1.393430 
Unemployment rate 8.335714 1.014212 7.864286 1.332209 5.080000 1.157090 
Tertiary education 26.758330 2.636961   39.850000 3.976864 26.845450 4.985051 
Patent Applications 266.708300 44.939020 92.216670 25.7300600 279.100000 64.282730 
TEA 3.291429 0.488174 8.432000 0.884347 5.371429 0.691096 
Future Entrepreneur 0.071428 0.006900 0.116000 0.023021 0.082857 0.011127 
Know Entrepreneur 0.305714 0.031014 0.340000 0.018708 0.461428 0.031320 
Potential Entrepreneur 0.372857 0.033022 0.538000 0.019235 0.365714 0.024397 
Fear of Failure 0.285714 0.035523 0.264000 0.027928 0.352857 0.063433 
Cost of bankruptcy       4     0       4     0       4     0 
Legal Origin French Civil Code English Common Code Scandinavian Civil Code 
 
 Finland France Germany 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Entry rate 9.892308 1.310510 6.869231 0.464371 9.961539 1.708576 
Bankruptcy rate  1.115385 0.199357 1.853846 0.320456 0.915384 0.128102 
GDP growth 3.711667 1.281350 2.118933 0.878887 1.586000 0.993771 
Unemployment rate 10.413330 3.140943 9.713333 1.306504 8.686667 0.950839 
Tertiary education 31.066670 2.563142 21.550000 2.310254 23.041670 1.228790 
Patent Applications 450.566700 100.257400 260.758300 33.088490 485.766700 88.499870 
TEA 5.717143 1.255823 4.202857 1.595877 4.805000 0.656742 
Future Entrepreneur 0.071428 0.013451 0.118571 0.051777 0.071666 0.009831 
Know Entrepreneur 0.477142 0.057940 0.388571 0.087641 0.363333 0.032041 
Potential Entrepreneur 0.380000 0.016329 0.3 0.0483046 0.373333 0.024221 
Fear of Failure 0.351428 0.046700 0.4742857 0.0547288 0.486666 0.016329 
Cost of bankruptcy       4     0 9 0 5.2 3.834058 
Legal Origin Scandinavian Civil Code French Civil Code German Civil Code 
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 Ireland Italy Netherlands 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Entry rate 13.192310 1.672554 7.661538 0.539349 9.930769 1.070346 
Bankruptcy rate  0.466666 0.098473 0.307692 0.049354 0.584615 0.121423 
GDP growth 6.880400 2.665333 1.494933 0.983197 2.721667 1.356783 
Unemployment rate 6.864286 3.726125 9.650000 1.982908 4.378571 1.547792 
Tertiary education 22.966670 3.490333 9.590909 1.518193 24.672730 3.028891 
Patent Applications 105.875000 27.013370 153.491700 28.330630 349.533300 79.087460 
TEA 8.280000 0.891422 4.492857 0.928596 4.782857 0.636912 
Future Entrepreneur 0.113342 0.012472 0.107142 0.017994 0.057142 0.004879 
Know Entrepreneur 0.412214 0.033181 0.348571 0.032366 0.312857 0.025634 
Potential Entrepreneur 0.488500 0.016904 0.391428 0.067188 0.375714 0.029920 
Fear of Failure 0.375171 0.020507 0.378571 0.079462 0.270000 0.036514 
Cost of bankruptcy 9 0 20.4 2.19089 4 0 
Legal Origin English Common Code French Civil Code French Civil Code 
 
 Norway Sweden United Kingdom 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Entry rate 7.727333 1.6074 5.031429 0.802494 12.900000 0.404145 
Bankruptcy rate  1.220000 0.273077 0.254666 0.116916 0.892307 0.149786 
GDP growth 3.197133 1.331045 3.074933 1.152798 2.886467 0.708594 
Unemployment rate 3.986667 0.986962 7.106667 1.687969 6.085714 1.479531 
Tertiary education 28.176640 2.835721 29.891670 2.553948 25.183330 2.865416 
Patent Applications 78.926670 12.609280 427.041700 64.216020 171.983300 24.321920 
TEA 8.100000 1.096221 3.926667 0.269715 5.922857 0.391863 
Future Entrepreneur 0.108571 0.015735 0.128000 0.023874 0.078571 0.013451 
Know Entrepreneur 0.408571 0.026726 0.475000 0.024289 0.262857 0.019760 
Potential Entrepreneur 0.402857 0.022146 0.426666 0.012110 0.492857 0.022886 
Fear of Failure 0.238571 0.033380 0.336666 0.039327 0.364285 0.043915 
Cost of bankruptcy 1 0 9 0 6 0 
Legal Origin Scandinavian Civil Code Scandinavian Civil Code English Common Code 
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 USA All 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Entry rate 10.200000 0.875595 9.645322 2.856674 
Bankruptcy rate  1.130769 0.259437 0.912222 0.463636 
GDP growth 2.943400 1.264976 2.970164 1.832085 
Unemployment rate 5.120000 0.674219 7.175132 2.718762 
Tertiary education 36.050000 2.368160 26.728860 7.502542 
Patent Applications 195.925000 24.228760 269.913900 139.884200 
TEA 10.935710 1.022739 6.002644 2.329766 
Future Entrepreneur 0.141428 0.013451 0.096551 0.031596 
Know Entrepreneur 0.367142 0.027516 0.378683 0.074655 
Potential Entrepreneur 0.53 0.032145 0.415971 0.074961 
Fear of Failure 0.2285714 0.0247848 0.3390368 0.0881728 
Cost of bankruptcy 7 0 6.661538 4.767327 
Legal Origin English Common Code  
Table 3: Cross-country correlations 
This table provides an overview of correlations for all variables in the dataset. 13 countries 
are included in the data over a period of thirteen years from 1995 to 2007. Entry rate is 
measured as number of new firm entries divided by the total number of companies in a 
certain country. Bankruptcy rate is defined as the number of bankruptcies relative to total 
active companies. Both variables on business demography are given as percentage. GDP 
growth is given as annual percentage change in constant prices. The standardized 
unemployment rates are provided in percent of civilian labor force. Education is 
characterized as tertiary attainment of the population aged 25 – 64, in percentage. Patent 
applications measure the number of patents filed to the EPO, per million of the working 
population. TEA indicates how many of the adult population is currently setting up a 
business or owning/managing a business existing up to 3.5 years, in percentage. Future 
entrepreneur index presents the share of the adult population expecting to start a business 
within three years, know entrepreneur index measure the share of people who personally 
know someone who started a business in the past two years, whilst potential entrepreneur 
index give an overview of the share of adults indicating to have the required skills and 
knowledge for setting up a business themselves. The fear of failure index represents how 
many of the total number of inhabitants that would abstain from setting up a business when 
they would sense a fear of failure. The cost of bankruptcy proceedings is calculated as a 
percentage of the total assets in the bankruptcy estate, while legal origin identifies each 
country‟s basis for the national commercial code. 
Cross-country Correlations 
 
 
 
Entry Bank Repay Autom Exemp GDP Unem Educat Patent TEA Future Know Poten Fear Cost Eng French Ger Scan 
Entry rate 
1,0000 
                  
Bankruptcy rate 
-0,2685 1,0000 
                 
Repayment years 
-0,4440 -0,5824 1,0000 
                
Automatic stay 
-0,4158 -0,3477 0,5039 1,0000 
               
Exemptions 
-0,3949 -0,0078 0,1991 0,0284 1,0000 
              
GDP growth  
0,4594 -0,1613 -0,1553 0,1294 -0,0886 1,0000 
             
Unemployment 
-0,5306 0,3245 0,1753 0,0466 -0,1168 -0,4677 1,0000 
            
Education 
0,5315 0,2743 -0,7044 -0,0133 -0,4132 0,4782 -0,2921 1,0000 
           
Patent application 
-0,3460 0,2388 -0,1069 0,0865 0,0545 -0,3528 0,5285 -0,0897 1,0000 
          
TEA 
0,5023 0,1317 -0,3111 -0,1936 -0,5272 0,5188 -0,4138 0,5282 -0,5246 1,0000 
         
Future entrepren. 
-0,0401 -0,0178 0,3102 0,3606 -0,2250 0,3250 -0,1598 0,1367 -0,6481 0,6143 1,0000 
        
Know entrepren. -0,0935 0,1132 0,2273 0,3344 0,0114 0,2208 0,1186 0,1140 0,2456 0,0282 0,2759 1,0000        
Potential entrep. 0,6001 -0,0664 -0,4461 0,0629 -0,5174 0,5303 -0,5278 0,6812 -0,5679 0,7348 0,4288 -0,1676 1,0000       
Fear of failure 
-0,2531 0,0757 0,2317 0,1067 0,2549 -0,1780 0,5460 -0,4154 0,4057 -0,4010 -0,1241 0,2997 -0,4580 1,0000 
     
Cost of estate 
-0,3117 -0,3882 0,7946 0,1259 0,2329 -0,0407 -0,0482 -0,6387 -0,5206 0,0136 0,4704 -0,0649 -0,2379 -0,0634 1,0000 
    
English origin 
0,6955 -0,1312 -0,3396 -0,1557 -0,4615 0,5786 -0,5633 0,4976 -0,6945 0,8348 0,4761 -0,2351 0,8961 -0,3909 0,0037 1,0000 
   
French origin  
-0,6330 0,1775 0,2291 -0,1557 0,6558 -0,4535 0,2368 -0,5386 -0,0414 -0,4684 -0,1473 -0,3214 -0,5622 0,0502 0,3884 -0,5333 1,0000 
  
German origin 
-0,0537 0,0922 -0,0593 -0,0658 -0,4311 -0,4358 0,5190 -0,2059 0,5769 -0,1265 -0,3028 0,0222 -0,1759 0,4917 -0,3958 -0,2254 -0,2254 1,0000 
 
Scandinavian orig. 
-0,0355 -0,1165 0,1681 0,4045 0,0701 0,1533 0,0224 0,1880 0,4557 -0,3365 -0,1728 0,6273 -0,2654 0,0575 -0,1824 -0,3849 -0,3849 -0,1627 
1,0000 
Table 4: Regression results 
Panel A presents robust OLS estimates (1), as well as fixed effects (2) and random effects 
estimates (3) for the data set consisting of observations of thirteen countries over the period 
of time from 1995 - 2007. Entry rate is the dependent variable in the main model of panel A, 
indicating how many new ventures are starting up relative to the total number of active 
companies in a country. Explanatory variables are as defined in tables 1-3. Panel B gives an 
overview of the legal origin model (4). This is a random effects model measuring the effect 
of how three of the legal origins; French, German and Scandinavian civil law, position 
themselves against the English common law origin which I use as base . Model (5) and (6) 
shows the results for the random effects estimations with year dummy variables. Entry rate is 
the dependent variable in the extended dummy model of panel B. All explanatory variables 
are as defined in tables 1-3. T-statistics are for all results shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Main Model    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Bankruptcy Rate  -1.2809413 
(0.5427281)* 
1.577148 
(0.5322168)** 
1.387658 
(0.5111006)** 
Repayment Years -0.07848844 
(0.0483505) 
-0.00768074 
(0.0232334) 
-0.00711684 
(0.0230808) 
Automatic Stay -1.6415825 
(1.231648) 
1.1367648 
(0.7121098) 
0.96669946 
(0.7027152) 
Exceptions -1.5612864 
(0.3812248)*** 
(dropped) -1.7584197   
(0.962579) 
GDP Growth 0.40038638 
(0.0907547)*** 
0.24281377 
(0.0662188)*** 
0.24857955 
(0.0644712)*** 
Unemployment Rate 0.06513253   
(0.0854871) 
-0.19347177 
(0.0736457)** 
-0.18094846 
(0.070074)** 
Tertiary Education
  
-0.00999413 
(0.0442798) 
-0.02678073 
(0.0370086) 
-0.02714535 
(0.034456) 
Patent Applications -0.00378093   
(0.0013542)** 
-0.0069222 
(0.0023587)** 
-0.0068559 
(0.0019917)*** 
Constant 12.912127   
(1.785595)*** 
11.289583 
(1.452405)*** 
13.040749 
(1.799624)*** 
    
R
2
 Within  0.3171 0.3158 
Between  0.0866 0.2552 
 Overall  0.4929 0.1037 0.2648 
P-value of Hausman Test   0.2727 
Number of observations 142 142 142 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes  No 
Random Effects No No Yes 
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Panel B. Extended Model 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Bankruptcy Rate  1.3004627 
(0.5028159)** 
 1.4216093 
(0.5136461)** 
-1.5782836 
(0.5898303)** 
Repayment Years -0.00221751 
(0.0232505) 
-0.00750257 
(0.023015) 
-0.0675636 
(0.0405525) 
Automatic Stay 0.89682297 
(0.7013893) 
1.0021373 
(0.7004353) 
-2.740806 
(1.079983)* 
Exceptions 0.67028362 
(1.263648) 
-1.7677915 
(1.087051) 
-1.5105669 
(0.3539001)*** 
GDP Growth 0.22808358   
(0.0659597)*** 
0.25390726 
(0.073087)*** 
0.38460428 
(0.1217345)** 
Unemployment Rate -0.15416916* 
(0.070149)* 
-0.18746848 
(0.0726626)** 
-0.05835356 
(0.0943705) 
Tertiary Education -0.03199631 
(0.0355511) 
  -0.02897 
(0.0358009) 
0.01365787   
(0.0414345) 
Patent Applications -0.00593985 
(0.0021645)** 
-0.00678066 
(0.0020935)** 
-0.00203922 
(0.0016038) 
French -4.5856993 
(1.842718)* 
  
German  0.56146323 
(2.357289) 
  
Scandinavian -3.7069819 
  (1.460414)* 
  
Bust 1999-2000  -0.04880331 
(0.2456272) 
 
Year94   1.8244302 
(1.582999) 
Year95   2.2860846 
(0.7948379)** 
Year96   2.0300725 
(0.7744217)** 
Year97    1.4772829 
(0.8166836) 
Year98   0.84450399 
(0.706151) 
Year01   0.36696392 
(0.7457521) 
Year02   0.23819926 
(0.7608973) 
Year03   0.56934246 
(0.7838514) 
Year04   0.31974307 
(0.7296829) 
Year05   0.52489742 
(0.7533845) 
Year06   -6.1015509 
(2.121481)** 
Constant 13.103977 
(1.815727)*** 
13.086831 
(1.911879)*** 
12.29018 
(1.655879)*** 
    
R2 Within 0.3148 0.3162 0.0876 
Between 0.5521 0.2532 0.7295 
 Overall  0.5249 0.2628 0.5717 
P-value of Hausman Test    
Number of observations 142 142 142 
Country Fixed Effects No No No 
Random Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4: Regression results (continued) 
Panel C shows the robust OLS estimates (7), in addition to fixed effects model with country 
fixed effects (8) and random effects estimates (9) for the data set of thirteen countries with 
observations in the time period from 2002 till 2006. Country fixed effects are employed in 
model (8). Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is the index used as dependent 
variable in the GEM-model of panel C, indicating how many people are currently in the 
process of establishing a business or have been self-employed, owners or managers of their 
own business for up to 3.5 years. TEA is measured in percentage. All explanatory variables 
are as defined in tables 1-3. The inclusion of this analysis represents a robustness check in 
which we may investigate the most recent effect of the bankruptcy variables. T-statistics are 
for all results shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Panel C. GEM Model 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Future Entrepreneur 33.109442 
(11.30009)** 
8.7997511 
(12.33634) 
19.464221 
(9.803131)* 
Know Entrepreneur 4.7927493 
(3.038091) 
6.6791004 
(5.815211) 
3.213079 
(3.962761) 
Potential Entrepreneur 15.216421** 
(4.490309)** 
10.26665 
(7.840491) 
14.940323 
(5.263123)** 
Fear of Failure -6.5759366 
(2.43189)* 
(0.86975976 
(3.514265) 
-2.6126041 
(2.681146) 
Cost of Estate -0.17737001 
(0.0467528)*** 
-0.11094125 
(0.1556142) 
-0.14728252 
(0.0752185) 
Repayment Years 0.06054169 
(0.027534)* 
0.0613375 
(0.0512349) 
0.06570888 
(0.0372115) 
Automatic Stay  -5.1883394 
(0.8032304)*** 
(dropped) -4.5394856 
(1.726836)** 
Exceptions -0.44509705 
(0.2638061) 
(dropped) -0.669548 
(0.6591647) 
Bankruptcy Rate -0.6144201 
(0.8692008) 
-0.07504437 
(0.8536098) 
-0.25576852 
(0.6672291) 
Constant -1.2558714 
(2.366455) 
-1.6068307   
(3.431977) 
-0.94408099 
(2.722615) 
    
R2 Within  0.3177 0.2895 
Between  0.1596 0.8334 
 Overall  0.7986 0.2053 0.7622 
P-value of Hausman Test   0.6915 
Number of observations 49 49 49 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes  No 
Random Effects No No Yes 
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Appendix B 
 
The United States 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Bankruptcy in the U.S. is regulated through federal law found in Title 11 of the United 
States Code, commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. Current law in the U.S. derives 
in large from the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and of 1994
16
. The legal 
areas of bankruptcy of which federal law does not speak, state legislation provide regulation. 
The latter typically regulate aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship. This way homestead 
exemptions, property rights and the validity of claims are dependent upon territory law and 
may vary substantially across the American states.  
The U.S. has a long history of debtor-friendly bankruptcy legislation. The creditors‟ rights 
scores of La Porta et al. (1998) reveal that the U.S.‟ creditor protection-value of 1 is close to 
the lowest possible score of zero. One of the underpinnings of the American bankruptcy 
system is the idea of a fresh start for entrepreneurs. Bankruptcy legislation and practices 
emphasize the reorganizing of debtors in financial distress with less emphasis on punishing the 
bankrupt. Bankruptcy proceedings can either be entered into voluntarily by a debtor or 
initiated by creditors, because of the U.S. debtor-friendly regulation; most bankruptcies in 
the U.S. sare voluntary initiated.  
 
Insolvency proceedings 
Individual and corporate insolvency proceedings will in the following receive a joint 
examination due to overlap in the proceedings possible for the two distinct types of debtors. 
Corporations and other business forms file under Chapters 7 or 11, whilst bankruptcy 
                                                   
16
 Public Law 103-394, October 22
nd
 1994. 
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proceedings for individuals include Chapter 7 and 13. The Bankruptcy Code does not 
impose any restrictions on individual‟s or companies‟ access to informal negotiations with 
their creditors regarding debt restructuring or cancellation. In fact, in recent years there has 
been an increased use of reorganizations outside the formal bankruptcy process as compared 
to the more costly court proceedings. However, in situations where creditors become 
aggressive and there is no hope for a resolution in out-of-court negotiation, court 
proceedings will be necessary. There are six types of bankruptcy under the US Bankruptcy 
Code, below are a run through of the three most used bankruptcy proceedings in the US 
Code – Chapter 7, 11 and 13.  
 
Reorganization Bankruptcy, Chapter 11 
For firms in financial distress a filing under Chapter 11 allows the enterprise to suspend 
interest and principal payments on debt for at least 120 days during which the firm has 
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization (this period is also known as automatic 
stay on assets). Insolvency is not a requirement for filing under Chapter 11 as the 
Bankruptcy Code allows even solvent firms to undergo this type of reorganization 
proceedings. The Chapter 11 model of Bankruptcy introduces the concept of Debtor in 
Possession (DIP) in which management retains control of the firm while creditors and the 
debtor negotiate with the Bankruptcy Court in order to agree on a repayment plan. If a 
majority of creditors vote against the confirmation of a specific plan, additional requirements 
may be imposed by the court in order to confirm the plan. If a plan is confirmed the debtor 
will continue to operate and pay its debts under the terms of the confirmed plan. 
A reorganization bankruptcy may take only a few months, but could last several years. The 
process might be long and complex and the reorganization could fail leaving the company 
liquidated instead. The justification of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is based on a belief that the 
value of a business as a reorganized going concern is substantially higher than the value of 
its assets if sold separate. Restructuring may enable some firms, in temporary financial 
distress, to eventually become successful. Filing reorganization bankruptcy is considered one 
of the main strategic options for many firms in financial distress (Lee 2007). If the company 
is reorganized, rather than liquidated, jobs will be saved, assets retained, and the remaining 
creditors and equity participants may have smaller losses than if the company were 
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dismantled. Chapter 11 represents the most debtor-friendly insolvency regime in the world, 
encouraging business management to preserve the going concern and to file for 
reorganization bankruptcy in time and not only when it‟s too late.  
 
Repayment Plan, Chapter 13 
One of the most common bankruptcy filings for individuals is through Chapter 13. 
Bankruptcy proceedings under this Chapter involve the rehabilitation of a debtor, with 
regular source of income, to allow him to allocate a measure of his future income to pay off 
creditors. This repayment plan varies in both length and amount of payment depending 
amongst other on the value of the debtor‟s assets and his income and expenses. However, a 
plan typically lasts for a period of three to five years, upon which time the debtor receives a 
discharge of all his pre-bankruptcy indebtedness. Such a broad based discharge upon 
completion of all payments under the court-approved plan, indicate that secured creditors 
may be entitled to greater payment than unsecured creditors. Generally, a Chapter 13 plan 
often does not require repayment to unsecured debts, such as credit cards or medical bills. 
Creditors are allowed to object to confirmation of the repayment plan, but cannot protest to 
the discharge if the debtor has completed his payments over the plan‟s horizon. Under the 
repayment plan, the debtor keeps control and ownership of all of his assets, but a trustee is 
appointed to supervise the assets disposal. A bankruptcy under Chapter 13 will be preferable 
for debtors who wish to retain assets beyond the exemptions under Chapter 7 liquidation. If 
the debtor were to fail on the plan of repayment under Chapter 13 he might apply for 
liquidation proceedings under Chapter 7.  
 
Liquidation, Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 governs the process of basic liquidation of individuals and businesses. A filing 
under this Chapter is the most common form of bankruptcy. When firms are non-corporate, 
debts of the firm are personal liabilities of the entrepreneur. If the firm fails, entrepreneurs 
have an incentive to file for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 as both business and 
personal debts will be discharged. State law allows for debtors to keep essential property 
known as exemptions. Typically, this includes household goods, clothes, a less valuable car, 
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etc. As mentioned the amount of property that a debtor may exempt varies from state to 
state, ranging from the bare basics to nearly unlimited value. The higher the exemption level, 
the more the debtor get to keep if he ends up facing bankruptcy, and the more attractive it is 
for potential entrepreneurs to go into business (White 2007).  
The Chapter 7 proceeding involves the appointment of a trustee who collects all of the non-
exempt property of the debtor, sells it and distributes the proceeds to the creditors. This 
model of bankruptcy allows the debtor to free himself, meaning he is discharged of personal 
liability for most of his pre-bankruptcy debt obligations, even if his debts have not been paid 
in full after the liquidation of his assets. Future earnings are completely exempt from the 
obligation to repay the creditors. There is no requirement to the liquidation process that the 
debtor needs to be insolvent, but one can only file for Chapter 7 relief once every eight 
year
17
. 
A corporation will not be able to receive a bankruptcy discharge; instead the legal entity will 
be dissolved. Consequently, a liquidation bankruptcy as the Chapter 7 model will not be a 
good strategic option for entrepreneurs wishing to continue their business operation within 
the same legal entity.  
 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 
This legal reform primarily affected consumers, making it more difficult for a person to file 
for liquidation under Chapter 7. Among its many changes is the implementation of a “means 
test” to determine whether a debtor is eligible for a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
implying that in cases where the debtor is categorized to be above a certain income limit, a 
filing under Chapter 7 will be prohibited. In addition, the consumer needs to undergo credit 
counseling prior to filing for bankruptcy.   
 
 
                                                   
17
 Before the legislative change of 2005 (BAPCPA), a debtor could file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 again after only six years  of the 
previous liquidation.  
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Canada 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Commercial and personal bankruptcies in Canada are regulated through federal legislation. 
The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) was originally passed in 1919; then amended in 
1949, 1992 and 2002. The modification of the Bankruptcy law in the 1990s included an 
expansion of debtor rights through the option of petitioning a reorganization proposal. Until 
1992 BIA focused mainly on asset liquidation rather than reorganizations (Swain, 2003). The 
amendment of BIA in 1992 introduced a more lenient bankruptcy regime on the debtor. 
Canada is consequently given a debtor-friendly ranging of 1 in the Creditor Protection Index 
of La Porta et al. (1998). Baird and Morrison argue that, “One of the main purposes of 
bankruptcy legislation is to afford the opportunity to a person, who is hopelessly burdened 
with debt, to free himself of the debt and start fresh” (Bankruptcy Canada, 2009). Being 
close to its neighboring country, the U.S., Canada also displays a highly debtor-friendly 
bankruptcy regulation.  
The new Bankruptcy laws were enforced by the Canadian government on the 18
th
 of 
September 2009 (Bankruptcy Canada 2009). The Companies‟ Creditors Arrangement Act 
(CCAA) provides a legislative framework for the reorganization of insolvent corporations. 
The statute enables an insolvent firm to seek a court order for an automatic stay on creditors, 
preventing the creditors from taking action against the company while negotiations for the 
rescheduling or compromise of the business‟ debts are undertaken. The Winding-up and 
Restructuring Act (WURA) supply an alternative framework to BIA concerning liquidation 
and distribution of an insolvent corporation's assets among its creditors.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
Under Canadian law there are two insolvency procedures for companies, liquidation 
bankruptcy and reorganization proposals. Canadian legislation does not hinder insolvent 
businesses or individual debtors to negotiate compromise arrangements and/or 
reorganization of their financial affairs with creditors outside the court.  
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Reorganization proposals 
A company in or approaching insolvency might be reorganized or sold as a going concern as 
an alternative to liquidation. In the case of a reorganization proposal, the debtor remains in 
control of company assets under the supervision of a trustee. The court‟s assistance is the 
principal difference between a proposal under the Canadian BIA and a Chapter 11 
reorganization under the U.S. Code. The trustee and business management work together in 
drafting a plan which will basically propose to the creditors to accept less than what they are 
owed in order for the company to survive and keep repaying the creditors for a given period 
of time.  
Under the BIA reorganization the debtor is granted an automatic 30-day stay on assets and 
temporary cessation of legal proceedings. Thereafter, if the court is satisfied that the debtor 
is working in good faith toward a viable proposal that will not materially prejudice the rights 
of secured lenders, three further stays of 45 days each may be granted (Swain, 2003). This 
way, the filing of a reorganization proposal under BIA will grant the firm breathing space 
against the claims of creditors to ensure the management puts all efforts into proposing a 
plan to relieve the enterprise of its pressing financial distress.  
 
Liquidation 
In a corporate liquidation bankruptcy the trustee takes possession of all the assets of the 
insolvent company, whereby he liquidates the assets to repay the creditors‟ claims. Company 
management is relieved of all dealings with creditors. Under BIA a firm may file for 
bankruptcy itself, or its creditors may petition the court to have it declared bankrupt. 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Canadian law provide two procedures in which an individual might resolve its personal 
insolvency – through bankruptcy or in filing a consumer proposal, or alternatively by making 
independent arrangements with creditors.  
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Consumer proposal 
The Canadian consumer proposal is a negotiated agreement between an individual debtor 
and his creditors. The proposal includes a plan by which the debtor makes monthly payments 
to the creditors for a maximum of five years. Filing for a consumer proposal under BIA 
might still be seen as a final resort for the individual in financial distress as an insolvent 
person may be deemed personal bankrupt if he defaults the on consumer proposal, or if the 
proposal is rejected by the creditors. However, generally the creditors accept the majority of 
consumer proposals. The basic requirement is that the creditors are better off under a 
consumer proposal than if the debtor were to go bankrupt.  
 
Personal bankruptcy  
A person might voluntarily file for bankruptcy, or his creditors may petition the court to 
make an order that a person is bankrupt. The latter is seldom used in practice in Canada. 
Either way, a trustee will be appointed to administer the liquidation. To file for bankruptcy 
in Canada, it is necessary for a person to be insolvent. The debtor‟s assets that are exempt 
from seizure by his creditors are regulated by territorial law. For debtors who have not been 
bankrupt before, an automatic discharge will take place after nine months if neither the 
creditors, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy or the trustee have opposed this. Another 
condition is that the debtor has received financial counseling. At this time most of the 
debtor‟s financial obligations are erased and he is given the ability to make a fresh start 
(Bankruptcy Canada 2009). However, if the debtor has been bankrupt before, the discharge 
will not be automatic and must be heard before a Judge or a Registrar (Swain 2003).   
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France 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
The French bankruptcy code is known as Book VI of the French Commercial Code, entitled 
“Businesses in Difficulty”. The bankruptcy code was enacted in 198518, and received 
substantial revisions in both 1994 and 2005. The 1994 amendments made access to the 
rehabilitation function contingent on a court determination that a debtor‟s emergence from 
financial distress is feasible. The 2005
19
 amendment is named the Safeguarding of 
Businesses (“la sauvegarde de l‟entreprise”), also known as the Reform of 2005.  
Article 1of the Bankruptcy Act sets the tone of the bankruptcy laws, listing the objectives of 
French insolvency as (1) Saving the enterprise, (2) Securing the preservation of jobs, and (3) 
Securing the payment of creditors‟ claims. Court interpretations of article 1 dictate that the 
objectives shall be taken into account in descending order of importance. Meaning, the 
principal and explicit objective of the French bankruptcy institute is to preserve the firm as a 
going concern and maintain employment, second comes the objective of satisfying creditors‟ 
claims. In accordance, all bankruptcy proceedings are court-administered and there is no 
mandate requiring the administrator to sell to the highest bidder. Franks elaborates on the 
French bankruptcy system, “The role of creditors is reduced to an advisory function, and 
their approval is not required by the court in selecting a reorganization plan.” 
The court controlled bankruptcy procedure in France provides few economic incentives to 
reorganize the company in an eﬃcient manner. Fried et al. noted in 2005 that “[The French] 
system was widely criticized as overly rigid and time-consuming. Nine out of ten 
bankruptcies in France resulted in the liquidation of the debtor” (Fried et al., 2005).  
In short, French bankruptcy law is known as being very creditor-unfriendly (Franks 2006). 
This is reflected in La porta et al‟s ranking of 1998 which gives France the minimum index-
value of 0 when it comes to creditor protection. Even secured creditors in France have little 
conﬁdence in recovering their debts. They usually cannot seize the security even when the 
enterprise is insolvent. In bankruptcy, they do not control either the timing or the method of 
collateral realization.  
                                                   
18
 Law No. 84-148 of March 1, 1984, effective March 1, 1985. 
19
 Decree No. 2005-845 of 26 July 2005 and Law No. 2005-845 of 26 July 2005 for the Protection of Enterprises (1). 
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Franks (2005) find that “French banks respond to a creditor-unfriendly code by requiring 
more collateral than lenders elsewhere and by relying on particular collateral forms that 
minimize the statutory dilution of their claims in bankruptcy”. Real estate collateral is the 
most important source of banks‟ recovery in most Western countries. However, in France 
this collateral group is far less valuable as sales proceeds are diluted by preferential creditors 
and because French bankruptcy courts tend to sell assets below their potential market prices 
in order to preserve employment. “By contrast, accounts receivable and personal guarantees 
can be realized by French banks directly, and the proceeds are not subject to dilution by 
preferential creditors. As a result, these collateral types are used more often than real estate 
at loan origination in France” (Franks 2006). In other words, the extensive use of personal 
guarantees may lead to increased levels of bankrupt entrepreneurs in France.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
The traditional idea of insolvency as debts being greater than assets does not exist in French 
law. Instead the law operates with a more restrictive concept of cessation of payments. 
Meaning, it is impossible for the debtor to meet current liabilities with the available assets 
(LaFont 1994). It is a requirement for the initiation of all bankruptcy proceedings that the 
debtor is in a situation of cessation of payments, meaning the company cannot meet its 
financial obligations with available assets such as cash and cash equivalents. In France, 
debtor-initiated filings are mandatory within 15 days of a debtor‟s inability to pay its debts 
as they fall due. Managers will be subject to sanctions for failure to file. France has 
incorporated an early warning system to prevent insolvency-procedures and dilution of 
assets in estates. This includes the demand for a company‟s auditor and management to alert 
the Banque de France if he discovers facts likely to compromise the continuity of the 
business. This warning system is designed to help companies reorganize early if facing 
financial distress.  
There are two different systems under French law for dealing with insolvency situations; any 
business may file for bankruptcy under French law through either (1) Liquidation procedures 
or (2) a court-ordered Arrangement for Restructuring the continuation or sale of a company 
through either the Amicable Settlement model or Judicial Arrangement. All proceedings 
require court supervision. The proceedings immediately described below are not eligible for 
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natural persons engaged in an independent profession, such as a sole entrepreneur. However, 
SMEs will be able to utilize these bankruptcy arrangements.  
 
Amicable Settlement (R´eglement Amiable)  
Unique to France is the possibility to restructure liabilities in an amicable settlement which is 
an unofficial proceeding performed under the court‟s supervision. In other words, this is a 
confidential undertaking and not all of the debtor‟s creditors will be invited to participate. 
This procedure‟s main objective is to protect employment by promoting continuation of the 
company. However, the procedure to seek an agreement with the creditors does not provide 
automatic stay and may only last for three months. If the company defaults during the 
settlement, creditors can petition the court to move the firm into official bankruptcy 
procedure, such as judicial arrangement or liquidation.  
 
Judicial Arrangement (Redressement Judiciare) 
This is the formal insolvency proceeding for reorganization of a company. The settlement‟s 
main purpose is to rescue companies and maintain the firm while saving jobs and restructure 
debt liabilities. Under this bankruptcy procedure the company‟s management is supervised 
by a court-appointed judicial administrator. The administrator‟s duty is to assess the viability 
of the company and propose a reorganization plan (European Judicial Network 2009). An 
important aspect of the Judicial Arrangement contrary to the Amicable Settlement is the 
introduction of automatic stay of claims. In addition, the debtor keeps the right to dispose 
and manage his assets under supervision of the court. However, from the time the 
rehabilitation proceeding start, the court together with the administrator are firmly 
controlling the company, promoting not necessarily efficient business policy goals related to 
the continuation of employment.  
The Judicial Arrangement-reorganization either involves a continuation plan, which may 
include a payment scheme (plan de redressement) to creditors lasting longer than ten years; 
or a sale of the business as a whole or some of its branches of activity. In evaluating offers 
on the company the administrator‟s only instruction is to choose the offer that ensures best 
prospects for continuing employment and repayment of credit. No assessment of the 
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financial gain of the sale is necessary. If the administrator finds proof that the company 
cannot be turned around, the company‟s assets are liquidated immediately in judicial 
liquidation. Sadly, in practice the vast majority (between 90 and 95 percent) of French firms 
which file for bankruptcy protection end up as liquidated assets. The result is that business 
management has very few incentives to file for judicial arrangement protection or to 
otherwise make value-maximizing decisions when a firm enters financial distress. 
 
Judicial Liquidation (Liquidation Judiciaire) 
A liquidation of a company in financial distress is announced if the court finds that 
reorganization through judicial settlement is manifestly impossible. A court-appointed 
administrator will oversee the winding up of the company. The administrator‟s top priority 
concern for the sale is the consideration for continued employment. Still, under a judicial 
liquidation the company‟s assets are sold to a third party through more flexible arrangements 
than under the reorganization procedure. 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Personal Recovery Procedure 
Natural persons with debts stemming from a company guarantee may open bankruptcy 
proceedings if the outlook of paying all the debt is unattainable and the debtor can prove that 
his situation is impossible to resolve without a reorganization of outstanding debt. An 
administrative board will be managing the procedure, proposing a plan for further 
postponement, re-scheduling or remission of creditor claims. If the administrative board 
discovers there is lack of assets to repay the debts, it will recommend a suspension of 
creditor‟s claims and provide the debtor with a fresh start.  
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Personal bankruptcy (fallite personnelle) 
Personal bankruptcy may be due to entrepreneurial failure, or it may also be imposed on the 
management of a corporate debtor, at the court‟s discretion, where it is shown that 
management failed to declare cessation de paiements within the required 15-day period. 
Personal bankruptcy in France will lead to liquidation of the individual‟s estate, and a 
liquidator will be appointed by the court to distribute the profits from the assets‟ sale among 
the creditors according to their preference. “If it is not possible to meet the debts of all the 
creditors, he declares the proceedings closed due to insufficient assets, which results in the 
erasing of the debtor‟s non-professional debts, with the exception of those paid by means of 
a guarantee” (European Judicial Network 2009). In principle, a debtor who is a natural 
person is given full capacity and can start a new business following the judgment closing the 
winding-up. As a main rule creditors must seize the pursuit of claims towards the debtor 
after the closure of the liquidation (European Judicial Network 2009). 
 
The reform of 2005 
Discussions concerning reform of the French bankruptcy system, moving it closer to a 
debtor-focused model, started early in our decade and in 2005 the Business Safeguard Act 
(la sauvegarde de l‟entreprise) was enacted. This new bankruptcy code introduced a number 
of changes to the existing bankruptcy procedures. The new Safeguard procedure is designed 
to facilitate going-concern reorganizations and resembles Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US. 
Like Chapter 11, the Safeguard Act seeks to promote voluntary filings before the actual 
cessation de paiements stage. A court order includes a stay on assets and the firm is able to 
focus on negotiations with its creditors. Most notably, the Safeguard laws allow management 
to retain control of the company‟s assets and provide for a more limited charge for the 
administrator. Le sauvegarde is meant to be a simplified redressement judiciaire, aiming to 
secure more successful rehabilitations – and fewer liquidations.  
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United Kingdom 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
In British jurisdiction
20
 bankruptcy proceedings are governed by the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Following the introduction of the Enterprise Act, which came into force in 2004, the period 
of repayment of pre-bankruptcy debt for personal debtors have been reduced from three 
years to a maximum of one year. Meaning, following the Enterprise Act the British have 
reduced the time to discharge and enabled entrepreneurs with the possibility to obtain a fresh 
start after only a year of payback to creditors.  
The legal regime in the United Kingdom is generally regarded as highly creditor-friendly 
(Franks, 2006) This is reﬂected in the creditors‟ rights scores of La Porta et al. (1998) which 
range from a minimum of 0 for low creditor protection to a maximum of 4 for the UK. 
Contrary to intuition Franks (2006) found that the proportion of going-concern 
reorganizations is actually higher in the UK than in France, where the primary stated 
objective of insolvency is to ensure the survival of the troubled company and thereby secure 
employment. This might be due to the fact that collateral, and thereby liquidation rights, are 
highly concentrated in the hands of the main British bank. The French creditor system on the 
other hand, is characterized by more competition in the banking sector and thus several 
smaller creditors have fewer incentives to keep the company as a going-concern.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
In a legal sense the term “bankruptcy” in the UK only relates to individuals21. For insolvent 
companies the concepts of Administration, Administrative Receivership or Liquidation 
apply. Insolvency is in Britain defined as having insufficient assets to meet all debts, or 
being unable to pay debts when they are due (European Judicial Network, 2009). 
                                                   
20
 The UK does not have a singular law concerning bankruptcy. The system is divided geographically including one legislative structure for 
England and Wales, one for Scotland and another for Northern Ireland. In this text I will mainly refer to the bankruptcy regulation in 
England and Wales.  
21
 Bankruptcy in Scotland is referred to as sequestration.  
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British regulation does not impose any restrictions on company‟s and individual‟s access on 
entering into informal negotiations and arrangements with their creditors regarding debt 
restructuring or cancellation. These are often referred to as pre-insolvency proceedings. 
 
Administration 
The Insolvency Act 1986 introduced two so called rescue mechanisms to allow insolvent 
companies to carry on running their business. The procedures, Administration and Company 
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), are both court-administered and like Chapter 11 of the US 
Code they provide the company with temporary protection from creditors‟ claims. This time 
restricted protection is also known as automatic stay on assets. At least 75% of the creditors 
have to approve the proposal put forward by the management in order for a company to 
enter into administration or obtain CVA. During the reorganization period the administrator 
usually runs the business, not the management. When approved, the arrangement is binding 
for all creditors who receive notice of the proposal. However, until the enforcement of the 
Enterprise Act 2004 the holder of a secured claim had the power to veto both procedures and 
appoint a receiver instead of the neutral administrator. The Enterprise Act has also made 
changes to the administration process to make it faster, fairer and more focused on the 
rescue of companies (European Judicial Network, 2009). 
 
Administrative Receivership 
In administrative receiverships, prior to the Enterprise Act of 2002, the insolvency 
practitioner‟s duty was principally to act in the interest of the appointing holder of security. 
Thus, a secured creditor in the UK could liquidate the company and realize the collateral 
without regard to the interests of other claimants, and his actions could not be challenged in 
the courts (Franks 2006). The Enterprise Act 2002 abolished administrative receivership for 
loans made after 15 September 2003, and substituted it with Administration. Under current 
law the Administrator is still appointed by the holder of the secured claim, but the 
administrator‟s duty now extends to all creditors. 
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Liquidation  
This legal process involves the realization and distribution of a company‟s assets and usually 
the closing down of the business (European Judicial Network, 2009). In essence, the court 
makes a winding-up order on the application of typically a creditor. The ownership of the 
assets remains with the company after it enters the insolvency procedure and no action can 
be continued against the company unless the court allows it.  
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
For individuals in financial distress the Insolvency Act 1986 differentiates between 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA) and bankruptcy. The voluntary arrangements are 
similar to the US Chapter 7 model and the Norwegian “Gjeldsordningsloven”.  
 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements 
An IVA is a proposal to the creditors for the debtor to pay some or all of the debtor's 
liabilities over a period of time by selling assets or making payment out of income or a 
combination of the two. Approval requires a majority vote in value in excess of 75% of the 
creditors. If the proposal is approved it binds all the debtor's creditors whether or not they 
have voted in favor of it (European Judicial Network, 2009). 
 
Personal Bankruptcy 
An insolvent individual may be declared bankrupt only by court order following a 
bankruptcy petition, either made by the debtor himself or his creditor(s). Bankruptcy 
involves the realization and distribution of an individual‟s assets and usually the closing 
down of any business. In personal insolvency the ownership of the bankrupt‟s assets is 
automatically transferred to the trustee. After one year of following a strict payback-plan to 
creditors the debtor may be released of his pre-bankruptcy debt. Previously this repayment 
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period was three years. The Enterprise Act of 2004 reduced this period of time to ensure 
failed but still aspiring entrepreneurs a fresh start over again.  
Trough this reform the British government wanted to reduce the stigma of failure and 
encourage rescue of honest and cooperative debtors. The Act‟s aim is to encourage more 
viable companies which get into financial difficulties to seek help at an earlier point when 
they are more likely to be rescued rather than liquidated. The European Judicial Network 
(2009) states that the British Government “recognizes that financial failure is not 
automatically the fault of the debtor. The aim of the Act is to ensure that each bankrupt is 
looked at on his/her own merits and to get away from a „one size fits all‟ approach”.  
 
Germany 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
The insolvency code of Germany is governed by the Insolvency Statute of 1994
22
, which 
came into force in 1999, and was amended by statutes of 2001 and 2004. The previous 
German Bankruptcy Act in effect before 1999 (Konkursordnung) received criticism as it 
implicit encouraged premature liquidations. This was the result of a secured creditor‟s ability 
to repossess assets in the event of the initiation of a reorganization procedure of companies 
in financial distress. Consequently, the lack of stay on the debtor‟s assets resulted in 
comparatively few successful reorganizations being completed.  
The 1999 code (Insolvenzordnung) limited the powers of the secured creditors to repossess 
their assets in reorganization by introducing an automatic stay on their claims for three 
months. The new legislation also introduced the concept of discharge in German law 
(Restschuldbefreiung), as individual debtors could be excused of their residual debt after 
following a payment plan for 7 years. This repayment period was reduced to six years in 
2001. Previously, this possibility to obtain a fresh start had not been available for German 
debtors.  
                                                   
22
 Bundesgesetzblatt of 5 October 1994 I S.2866 
 104 
Regarding creditor protection, strong control rights were previously given to secured 
creditors, thereby contributing to the effect of favoring liquidation of an enterprise rather 
than its continuation as a going concern. The 1999 code reduced the creditor‟s influence, 
making it somewhat less creditor-friendly. Still, considerable control is given to the creditor 
in the insolvency proceedings. La Porta et al attributes an index-value of 3 to the German 
pre-1999 code.  
Grounds for opening insolvency proceedings in Germany are inability to meet payment 
obligations when they are due and/or over-indebtedness. Imminent inability to make 
payment is also sufficient for an insolvency application by a debtor. Both a legal entity and 
natural person may be the subject of insolvency proceedings under German law.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
Two formal insolvency procedures existed under the old German bankruptcy code, (1) 
composition by court (Vergleichsordnung) and (2) compulsory liquidation 
(Konkursordnung).  The new German code simplified the legislation and consists of only 
one system of regulation (Insolvenzordnung). In the following I will first introduce the 
previous legislative arrangements and then move on to the current law in effect. 
 
Composition (Vergleichsordnung) 
The previous court composition was a reorganizing procedure set up to release the company 
from its financial distress by restructuring its unsecured debt. In German compositions the 
court appoints a receiver whose responsibility it is to act on behalf of all creditors
23
, 
supervise the firm‟s operations and assess the feasibility of the proposed plan of 
arrangement. The claimants‟ votes in favor of the plan are binding for all creditors by simple 
majority
24
. However, due to limited automatic stay only affecting unsecured claims and 
which did not prevent the claims or legal actions by secured and preferred creditors, the 
initial attempt on restructuring a company in distress often ended in liquidation. For many 
                                                   
23
 The receiver does not represent any one group of creditors, but is bound by the resolutions of the creditors‟ meeting, which he must 
implement.  
24
 The rule is three-quarters majority by value. 
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companies the only alternative to entire or piece-meal liquidation was an out-of-court 
workout with creditors.  
 
Liquidation Bankruptcy (Konkursordnung) 
German regulation on compulsory liquidation dating from the years previous to 1999, stated 
that a court appointed insolvency administrator would be responsible for conducting the sale 
of the debtor‟s assets. Still, this was often a long process if the proceedings from a sale were 
deemed unfavorable. Consistent with the court composition mentioned above, an automatic 
stay on unsecured claims was in force under compulsory liquidation. In practice, many 
petitions for the latter type of bankruptcy were closed as a result of insufficient assets to be 
distributed to unsecure claims after secured creditors‟ collateral was seized.  
 
The 1999 code (Insolvenzordnung) 
Reorganization Procedure 
The amendments in the 1999 code removed the advantages of the secured creditors and 
introduced automatic stay affecting this group of preferred claims as well as the unsecured 
claims. This reform seemingly increased the probability of the survival of enterprises by 
limiting the ability of the secured creditors to strip the company of its essential assets 
(Franks, 2006). Still, the acceptance of the creditors‟ meeting is required to pass the plan 
proposed by the court-appointed receiver. Half of the creditor‟s votes in number are required 
to accept the plan. Thus, a creditor holding more than 50% of secured claims can veto the 
reorganization plan that impedes the rights of the secured creditors (German Law Journal 
2009).  
 
Liquidation Procedure 
A court-appointed insolvency administrator will decide on the method of the asset‟s 
realization and distribute the means in order of the claims preferences. The company might 
be sold as a whole or broken up and sold piece-meal. After the final distribution of assets and 
the following closure of insolvency proceedings, creditors with remaining claims can 
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continue pursuit of their claims against the debtor without restriction. However, if the debtor 
is a natural person he may according to the 1999 code apply to be granted a discharge of his 
remaining debts.  
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
The new German Insolvency Act of 1999 opens for a personal debtor to achieve a discharge 
of residual debts (Restschuldbefreiung). The code introduced a discharge of residual debts 
after seven years, which was reduced to six years in 2001. If a natural debtor is granted 
discharge his creditors may no longer try to enforce claims against the debtor and he is 
allowed a financially fresh start. 
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Italy 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
The over 60 year old Italian bankruptcy law of 1942
25
 was recently the subject of an organic 
reform. The new rules in effect from 2006
26
, and further amended in 2007
27
 and 2009, are 
aimed at introducing more effective and efficient regulation of pre-bankruptcy schemes and 
are intended to favor going-concern transfers over piecemeal sales, as well as giving larger 
powers to the bankruptcy trustee (Doing Business 2009).  
Italy‟s previous bankruptcy regulation was often characterized as inefficient and inflexible. 
Although the law received amendments over time it still embraced society‟s contemporary 
view in the 40ies, as insolvency was considered an offense to the economy, bankruptcy 
proceedings as a punishment for the entrepreneur, and liquidation of assets as the only 
remedy available for creditors (Crosio and Origoni 2008). The law contained substantial 
barriers to effective company reorganization and debt restructuring, and involved high costs 
relating to the insolvency procedures which ended up consuming a large part of the estate‟s 
asset value. Unsecured creditors seldom recovered their claims, resulting in a negative 
reallocation of resources in the Italian economy. In addition, the bankruptcy process was 
time-consuming, often lasting as much as 7 – 8 years (Beye and Nasr 2008). 
As the new law is aimed at creating a process similar to Chapter 11 in the US Code, the 
reform has shifted the focus away from liquidation as the primary legitimate bankruptcy 
procedure and towards more cases of company debt restructuring and reorganization. 
However, as this thesis‟ focus is on a relatively large time span it will not be able to capture 
all aspects of the post-reform bankruptcy regulation in Italy. 
The main objective of the Italian bankruptcy law has traditionally been to protect the 
interests of the creditors. Accordingly, the pre-reform bankruptcy proceedings were mainly 
aimed at liquidation of insolvent enterprises and elimination from the market of firms in 
financial distress. In addition, the legislation was particularly harsh on failed entrepreneurs. 
Debtors were by law treated nearly as criminals, deprived of the right to vote and prohibited 
from reentering the market as restarting entrepreneurs. La Porta et al‟s Creditor Protection 
                                                   
25
 The 1942 Bankruptcy Act, Regio Decrento 16 marzo 1942, n.267    
26
 The new bankruptcy reform consisted of several steps which adopted various laws and decrees piece meal. 
27
 The Corrective Decree of September 12, 2007 (Legislative Decree No. 169), effective January 1, 2008 
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index probably does not reflect this debtor-unfriendliness in a sufficient way, as Italy only 
gets a score of 2 in their evaluation of Italian insolvency law.  
The regulation and procedures governing creditor arrangements were significantly modified 
by the reform. Still, one might say that the new legal framework support, and perhaps also 
strengthen Italian creditor‟s rights, as it provides a more efficient system and seemingly 
stimulates the flow of credit to SMEs enabling post-bankruptcy growth both for the creditor 
and debtor.  
Italian law defines insolvency as the situation where commercial operators are no longer able 
to meet their obligations (European Judicial Network 2009). In the following I will first 
present the previous bankruptcy proceedings under Italian law, and then look closer at the 
recent changes in Italian bankruptcy legislation. 
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
There were two types of bankruptcy proceedings in Italy before the reform – liquidation and 
minor bankruptcy procedures such as (1) The Controlled Administration and (2) Preventive 
Creditors‟ Settlement Procedure28. Liquidation is naturally still an operative alternative 
within bankruptcy proceedings. However, the procedure for liquidating a debtor's assets and 
distributing the proceeds among its creditors has received substantial simplification to reduce 
cost and time spent.   
 
Liquidation  
Previously the principal bankruptcy proceeding in Italy was the liquidation procedure – the 
fallimento. The purpose of this bankruptcy procedure is to satisfy the creditors‟ rights and to 
remove the insolvent enterprise from the market. Commercial businesses are the only firms 
that can be subject to a compulsory liquidation process. Meaning, subject to these 
                                                   
28
 Concordato preventivo 
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proceedings is any company or individual whose main activity consists of the production or 
trade of goods and services.  
Where the liabilities are greater than the assets, the creditors retain the right to receive 
payment of the sums owed to them even after the proceedings have been brought to an end, 
unless the debtor has collaborated fully during the bankruptcy proceedings and is allowed by 
the court to waive the outstanding debts under a new mechanism introduced in the recent 
reform known as esdebitazione – meaning discharge. Previously there existed no such legal 
mechanism. 
 
Minor bankruptcy procedures 
The so-called minor bankruptcy procedures were designed to avoid a debtor‟s bankruptcy. 
Only the filing of a petition by the debtor may initiate these procedures. The purpose of the 
minor bankruptcy procedure called Controlled Administration was to re-establish the 
financial health of a firm by allowing a postponement of creditor claims for a limited period 
of time. During this period of time, the firm continued to do business under the debtor‟s 
management supervised by a commissioner or a judge, while it was granted a temporary stay 
of collection actions. This Controlled Administration was initiated on the specific 
supposition that the firm‟s difficulties with fulfilling its obligations were temporary. Often 
there was required evidence in the form of a preparation of a plan that the enterprise could be 
saved. However, the debtor was allowed to suspend payments on claims to creditors for up 
to two years. Often, the debtor at the end of the period still was not able to pay all of his 
previous financial obligations, and in many cases liquidation was the only real solution.   
To be able to reach an agreement with the creditors to reduce the total amount of claims and 
postpone payments on enterprise debt, the Preventive Creditors‟ Settlement Procedure was 
often used in addition to the Controlled Administration. This is not a direct re-organization 
of the firm, but it may be considered to indirectly permit reorganization of an enterprise 
because it can result in maintaining, even if partially, an enterprise in the market.   
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Post-reform insolvency proceedings 
As mentioned Italy has enacted a comprehensive reform of the Bankruptcy Act which 
amongst other has introduced several pre-bankruptcy schemes of arrangements to help 
companies in financial difficulties recover through more flexible arrangements with their 
creditors, as well as the possibility for a natural debtor to achieve discharge from unpaid debt 
after bankruptcy procedures.  
 
Out-of-court debt restructuring plan 
Informal, out-of-court debt restructuring agreements with creditors are now possible for 
Italian debtors who find themselves in financial distress but not yet insolvent. Debtors 
continue management of the enterprise but might need to surrender certain company assets 
to their creditors or obtain extensions for payment plans.  
 
Debt restructuring agreement 
As mentioned, there were previously no procedure in Italian bankruptcy law for proposing a 
modified repayment plan to the creditors as compared for example to Chapter 11 of the US 
Code. Recent amendments resulted in a legislation that formally allow for debt restructuring 
plans in arrangements with creditors. To a certain extent the reform of 2005 reflects features 
of the US Chapter 11 regime. A distressed firm may seek court authority to implement a 
debt-restructuring agreement, provided it has been approved by creditors holding at least 60 
percent of the company's liabilities (Beye and Nasr, 2008). The plan must contain a debt 
restructuring forecast and proposals to pay the debts in some form. While payment of all 
secured claims is still required, no threshold applies to the payment of unsecured claims 
(Crosio and Origoni 2008). 
Where the arrangement procedure is accepted, the debtor retains control of the company‟s 
assets and activities under the supervision of a receiver. Once a debt-restructuring agreement 
has been filed with the insolvency court and published in the Register of Companies, the 
debtor company may benefit from an automatic stay of any enforcement proceedings against 
its assets for a period of 60 days (Beye and Nasr 2008). 
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The amendments of Italy's bankruptcy laws has provided a more effective and efficient 
procedures governing the liquidation and reorganization of distressed companies, giving the 
firms greater flexibility in attempting to address their financial problems. The reform has 
also removed the previous restrictions preventing a bankrupt from restarting another 
business after bankruptcy proceedings (European Judicial Network 2009), the concept of 
discharge from indebtedness for individual debtors is as mentioned also introduced in the 
new legislation.  
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Norway 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Norwegian bankruptcy proceedings are primarily regulated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1984
29
 
(Konkursloven) and Dekningsloven of the same year. Under this legislative basis both 
individual and company bankruptcy is regulated.  
Norway was ranked first of the Nordic countries in bankruptcy legislation by the Nordic 
Innovation Monitor in 2009. “Among other things, this can be explained by very low costs 
associated with closing of an insolvent business” But Norway also received some criticism 
from the same source; “Although top-performing in terms of bankruptcy legislation, Norway 
lags significantly in the area of restarting possibilities. The problem of having strong 
bankruptcy legislation is that it might be difficult for an entrepreneur to restart.” Thus, 
Norway provides swift bankruptcy procedures but does not currently focus enough on the 
needed incentives for an aspiring but once failed entrepreneur to restart the creative process 
of building a company.  
As most other Scandinavian countries, the bankruptcy law in Norway is regarded as more 
creditor-friendly than not. Consideration for the creditors is of high importance to ensure a 
well functioning credit supply to SMEs. La Porta et al attributes a ranking of 2 to the 
Norwegian protection of creditors in its Creditor Rights Index, the lowest creditor rights 
value being zero.  
Norwegian law necessitate that the debtor is insolvent as a requirement to be deemed 
bankrupt. The debtor might petition himself bankrupt, but more frequently approach in this 
respect is a petition from the debtor‟s creditors.  
The main rule in the bankruptcy law is no discharge of outstanding debt, even after a 
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the bankrupts‟ assets to his creditors. The stated 
objective of the Norwegian bankruptcy institute is not to delete the debtor‟s obligations to 
his creditors, but to ensure an orderly and fair distribution of the assets in a failed enterprise. 
For corporations this main rule will still not be made effective as a result of the owners 
having limited liability of the company‟s financial obligations. However, this rule might 
                                                   
29
 Law of the 8th of  June 1984 n.58 (Konkursloven) and Law of the 8th of  June 1984 n.59 (Dekningsloven) 
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come to be of grave importance to aspiring entrepreneurs not having enough equity to be 
able to form a limited company; or for entrepreneurial firms where the owners have had to 
give personal guarantees to be able to attain financing. For consumers there exists an 
exception to this main rule through the Debt Negotiation Law (Gjeldsforhandlingsloven). 
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
The Norwegian Bankruptcy Act includes three procedures primarily for insolvent 
companies; (1) Liquidation bankruptcy, and reorganization through the processes of (2) 
Voluntary Debt-Restructuring (Frivillig Gjeldsordning) or (3) Compulsory Composition 
(Tvangsakkord). For the two latter procedures it is not a requirement that the debtor is 
insolvent or that it is a company.  
 
Voluntary Debt-Restructuring (Frivillig Gjeldsordning) 
This is a negotiated agreement between the debtor and his creditors that might include delay 
of payment, partly cancelation of debt owed to the creditor and/or a liquidation of some part 
of the debtor‟s assets. All claimants are required to agree before a voluntary debt 
restructuring is made effective.  
 
Compulsory Composition (Tvangsakkord) 
This arrangement includes a full reconstruction of corporate debt, partly through the 
company‟s payment to its creditors, but also due to the creditor‟s cancelation of some part of 
their claims towards the debtor. The formal requirement for a debtor to be able to attain this 
arrangement is that no less than 25% of the secured claims may be realized, if so the 
majority of claimants may bind the opposing creditors. The requirement of 25% realization 
of secured claims may only be subsided if all creditors agree on the negotiated arrangement.  
As opposed to the objective of liquidation the main purpose of the Norwegian reorganization 
bankruptcy procedures are to preserve employment and the continuation of businesses as this 
for the most part is desirable out of broad social considerations.  
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Liquidation bankruptcy 
Under the Norwegian Bankruptcy Act the debtor‟s assets will be sold by the court-official 
administrating the liquidation, and the financial means attained will be distributed to the 
creditors based on the nature of their claims. One of the requirements in this process is that 
the assets must be sold in a way that gives the highest profit for the estate. As mentioned, the 
discharge of debt is as a main rule not possible under Norwegian law. Bankrupt natural 
debtors will after formal procedures are over and the company is dissolved; still be liable for 
the remaining pre-bankruptcy debt. 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Consumer Proposal (Gjeldsordningsloven) 
Due to the Norwegian bank-crisis in the 1980s and the increase in personal bankruptcies in 
the wake of the crisis, the government decided to reform the legal basis to include a 
consumer proposal in effect 1993
30
. This enables individuals in deep financial distress to 
propose a reorganization plan for their creditors, thus enabling them to attain a fresh start. 
And an individual debtor such as an entrepreneur may only make a petition through the 
Consumer Proposal (Gjeldsordningsloven) once in his lifetime. 
The main rule in the Norwegian Consumer Proposal is that it only applies to natural persons, 
not enterprises. Sole entrepreneurs conducting business activity may only as an exception 
fall under the law‟s regulation. One of the requirements for this exception is that the business 
has ceased to exist and that the business organization can be characterized as not complex. 
After a liquidation bankruptcy the company will be dissolved and the individual entrepreneur 
might then petition for a consumer proposal after all.  
The proposal usually involves the debtor paying the creditors all of his excess income after 
his expenses are covered, for the duration of typically a five year period. As a consequence, 
this arrangement demands high sobriety of the debtor over a relatively long period. 
However, at the end of the period most of the debtors‟ outstanding debt is discharged.  
                                                   
30
 Law of the 17th of July 1992, no.99 (Gjeldsordningsloven)  
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Liquidation bankruptcy  
As mentioned, the remaining claims from the creditors will not be discharged after cessation 
of the bankruptcy procedure under the Norwegian Bankruptcy Act. Above a certain 
exemption level, all of the debtor‟s future income will have to be distributed to his creditors, 
until all debt is repaid.  
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Denmark 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Bankruptcy in Denmark is governed by the Danish Bankruptcy Act of 1997 (Konkursloven). 
In the past years, minor amendments have been made to the bankruptcy legislation on 
several occasions
31
. Both individual and company bankruptcy is regulated under the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
Denmark has recently made significant progress in making its bankruptcy law more 
entrepreneurial-friendly. A legislative modification of 2005 made it easier for debtors to gain 
debt restructuring. Upon an evaluation of the insolvency system the Danish High Court 
found that many procedural delays were caused by the trustee. A law amendment in 2006 
provided measures for creditor and judicial monitoring of trustees' work, and institutes 
financial incentives for trustees to conduct proceedings more efficiently.  The amendment in 
2007 made the processing of an insolvent estate more efficient, by reducing the time spent 
on closing a bankrupt business (Doing Business, 2009). According to the Nordic innovation 
Monitor of 2009 Denmark is now ranked 6th in the area of bankruptcy legislation. But in 
terms of business restarting possibilities, which covers access to aid and debt rescheduling 
for financially distressed companies, Denmark performs less well according to the 
Innovation Monitor. 
As the other Scandinavian countries Danish bankruptcy law is characterized by a restrictive 
approach towards debtor‟s rights. The main concern of the law is towards protection and 
uphold of the creditor‟s claims. La Porta et. al attributes a creditor protection value of 3 to 
the Danish bankruptcy law, the highest value of all the Scandinavian countries.  
Under the Bankruptcy Act a debtor is regarded as insolvent if he cannot meet his obligations 
as they fall due unless the inability to pay must be assumed to be merely temporary. 
Insolvency in Denmark is sometimes used to describe the situation where a person's 
liabilities are greater than his assets. Both the debtor and a creditor may petition for 
bankruptcy proceedings when the debtor is insolvent. 
                                                   
31
 Most recently Act no. 118 of 4 February 1997 was amended by Act no. 402 of 26 June 1998. In January 2001 the Ministry of Justice set 
up a bankruptcy board with its intention to submit recommendations for further amendments and reforms to the act.  
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Business Insolvency proceedings 
Automatic stay on the debtor‟s assets through out the suspension of payments is under 
Danish bankruptcy law not meant to solve a debtor's financial problems through estate 
administration, but will only act as a forerunner of either compulsory or voluntary 
composition, debt rescheduling or a winding-up procedure. Any debtor who believes that he 
will not be able to fulfill his obligations may file for suspension of payments. There are two 
forms of suspension of payments within Danish insolvency practice, (1) suspension of 
payments filed with the bankruptcy court, and (2) unannounced (non-filed) suspension of 
payments.  
 
Reorganization 
The Danish reorganization rules provides an alternative to bankruptcy where the company is 
liquidated. There are two procedures possible; Composition (Akkord) and Compulsory 
Composition (Tvangsakkord).  
Voluntary Composition (Akkord) 
A composition under the Danish Bankruptcy Act involves an agreement between the debtor 
and his creditors regulating payment of the outstanding balance (European Judicial Network 
2009). Usually, creditors forgive or postpone required payments for part of the debt. In 
return the firms‟ continued existence will over time generate more means to the creditors 
than if it were to be liquidated. All claimants need to agree on the negotiated composition 
before it is binding.  
 
Compulsory composition (Tvangsakkord) 
Another reconstructive alternative to liquidation bankruptcy is compulsory composition. 
This proceeding is available both for natural persons and for companies. The composition 
involves a situation where a qualified majority of a debtor‟s creditors force the rest of his 
claimants to accept an arrangement under which the debtor is granted a percentage reduction 
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of the non-preferential debt, an extension of payment, or both, so that liquidation may be 
avoided. The composition may alternatively include a distribution of the debtor‟s assets 
among his creditors in exchange for which the debtor is released from the part of the debt 
that is not settled, or moratorium. The composition must be accepted by at least 60% of the 
creditors according to preference of claims and size of the debts in order for the arrangement 
to take effect.  
 
Liquidation Bankruptcy (Konkursdekret) 
If a company is insolvent, the company can be dissolved through a winding-up of its assets. 
The debtor's property and other assets are sold and any proceeds are distributed among his 
creditors according to the ranking stated in the bankruptcy law. Initial and immediate effects 
of liquidation include that the debtor looses the right to dispose of the estate, and an estate 
management consisting of a trustee is established.  There are no possibilities for discharge 
for company debtors as the Danish expect it be of no practical relevance since the 
corporation is dissolved at the completion of liquidation. Implied in this is that bankrupt 
entrepreneurs may petition for a discharge under the Bankruptcy Act regulating the 
insolvency of natural persons.  
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Liquidation 
For debt obtained within non-corporate companies the entrepreneur will be personally liable 
for any obligations. The liquidation procedure for individuals is corresponding to that of 
corporations. However, after bankruptcy proceedings are completed an individual debtor will 
still be liable for the debt not paid through the bankruptcy proceedings. Under many 
circumstances the creditor may uphold his claims on the debtor until which time the claim 
becomes statute-barred. This might last for up to 20 years depending on the type of debt and 
the claim‟s security. 
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Debt rescheduling (Gældssanering) 
Two years after a liquidation bankruptcy a natural person may apply for debt rescheduling. 
This scheme involves a reduction or cancellation, of the natural debtor‟s entire debt or parts 
thereof. The Danish debt rescheduling system is intended for hopelessly indebted personal 
debtors. The debtor must prove that he is not able to and is not expected to be able to fulfill 
his debt obligations in the next few years and that his situation and circumstances otherwise 
speak in favor of a debt rescheduling (European Judicial Network 2009). Only about one 
third of debtor-applicants are granted debt rescheduling and the typical time horizon in the 
payback-plan is a period of five years before the remaining debt is discharged. Accordingly, 
it takes up to seven years before an entrepreneur may be discharged in Denmark, given that 
he is granted the debt rescheduling procedure.  
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Sweden 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Swedish bankruptcy procedure is regulated under the Bankruptcy Act of 1987
32
, which was 
amended through the Company Reorganization Act of 1996
33
. The latter reform included 
aims to turn the main purpose of bankruptcy proceedings towards reorganization instead of 
liquidation (Tuula 2003). 
Compared to the other Scandinavian countries examined in this thesis, Sweden lags behind 
in the area of promoting entrepreneurship through bankruptcy legislation. The Nordic 
Innovation Monitor registers a substantially poorer ranking for Sweden than for its 
neighboring countries. “The poor ranking is explained by the higher costs incurred when 
closing a bankrupt enterprise, the time spent on closing a company, and the fact that the 
creditors on average are granted a lower share of their claims”. Sweden holds the worst 
framework conditions on restart possibilities for previous bankrupt entrepreneurs.  
In accordance to the other Scandinavian countries Sweden is characterized as having a 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy law. Sweden receives an index-value of 2 from the Creditor 
Protection ranking of La Porta et al, the same as Norway.   
Insolvency is defined in the Swedish Bankruptcy Act as being unable to pay one‟s debts in a 
proper manner where such inability is not temporary (European Judicial Network 2009). 
Both enterprises and individual debtors may enter into out-of-court voluntary arrangements 
negotiated with the creditors, in order to reduce debt or restructure the payment plan.  Such 
arrangements are not specifically regulated by the Swedish bankruptcy law. Remarkable few 
disputes are in Sweden settled in the public courts (Tuula 2003). Both debtors themselves 
and their creditors may petition for bankruptcy.  
 
                                                   
32
 The Bankruptcy Act, 1987:672 
33
 Business Reorganization Act  of 1996 (no. 764).  
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Business Insolvency proceedings 
Reorganization (Rekonstruktion) 
Firms can apply for reorganization bankruptcy under the Company Reorganization Act of 
1996. Swedish bankruptcy law allows both voluntary agreements between the parties and 
compositions imposed by a court, in which case it is binding on all creditors (compulsory 
composition). A compulsory composition proposition that grants the creditors less than 50% 
of their initial claim‟s value is approved and binding for all claimants if it is accepted by 
creditors representing 75% of the amount of the total claim. 
For a debtor to be eligible of reorganization procedures he must show likelihood of 
insolvency, meaning that if the company is unable to pay its overdue debts or will be unable 
to do so in the near future (European Judicial Network 2009), but the debtor also needs to 
show that survival is possible. An administrator is appointed to supervise the reorganization 
of the company and examine whether the conditions needed to continue operating exists. The 
debtor must have the administrator‟s approval before presenting a financial arrangement to 
its creditors. The debtors together with the administrator have the right to formulate a plan 
about a week from the filing. But Swedish law does not allow for any automatic stay on 
creditor‟s claims in this period. The reorganization procedure lasts three months and may be 
extended by three months at a time. If composition proceedings are not successfully 
concluded however, the reorganization procedure may not last for more than one year (Tuula 
2003). 
Under the entire reorganization procedure the management keeps the right of disposition 
over company assets, but they have to get permission from the administrator before they are 
entitled to act on behalf of the company (European Judicial Network 2009). As a result the 
Business Reorganization Act is seldom used in Swedish economy (Tuula 2003).   
 
Liquidation 
As mentioned there are some obstacles to the Business Reorganization Act 1996 ability to 
efficiently reorganize an insolvent company. Instead a partly reorganization may be attained 
through the Bankruptcy Act 1987. This typically occurs when the debtor has passed the time 
border for reorganization. Both a debtor and his creditors may file a petition initiating a 
liquidation bankruptcy.  
 122 
 
Under the Swedish legal system a trustee is appointed in order to administrate the 
liquidation. Once the liquidation has taken place, the means are to be distributed amongst the 
claimants following further regulation on the preference of claims.  
Debts owed to unsecured creditors are eliminated through the Bankruptcy Act 1987 and the 
legal entity (the company) is dissolved at the end of the process. After the bankruptcy 
proceeding is finished, the business can continue its operations with the old owners in a new 
entity. Thus, it is quite common for Swedish companies to reduce their debts through 
bankruptcy, whilst the owners start a new company buying the bankrupt entity‟s important 
assets, often also the name of the company. The process of liquidation is more commonly 
used in Sweden than reorganization (Tuula 2003). 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
The formal bankruptcy process is rarely done for individuals as personal bankruptcy in 
Sweden in principle equals lifelong payback to pre-bankruptcy creditors. However, for the 
natural debtors hopelessly indebted the Swedish Government introduced the concept of 
individual debt restructuring in 2006.  
 
Debt restructuring 
Individuals may apply for debt restructuring (Skuldsanering) under the Debt Restructuring 
Act of 2006
34
. It is however required that the individual is so deeply in debt that he cannot 
be able to pay his debts in the foreseeable future. 36% of all Swedes that asks for debt 
restructuring are failed entrepreneurs. 
Armour and Cumming (2008) indicate that the Swedish repayment period is five years. 
However, according to professor Johan Wiklund this is not a correct observation. Nearly no 
debtors obtain discharge under Swedish law, accordingly life long repayment of pre-
bankruptcy debt is the main rule for Sweden‟s failed entrepreneurs.  
                                                   
34 Debt Restructuring Act (2006:548)  
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Finland 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Current law regulating bankruptcy proceedings in Finland is the Bankruptcy Act of 2004
35
. 
Legislation on the adjustment of debts of a private individual
36
 and the restructuring of 
enterprises is regulated under law of 1993
37
. An amendment to the latter law was 
implemented as recent as in 2007
38
 when Finnish government‟s revisions made it easier for 
companies in financial distress to reorganize.  
With an index-value of 1, La Porta et al ranges the Finnish Bankruptcy Act as not primarily 
creditor-friendly. Still, an article comparing US and Finnish bankruptcy regulation (Ravid 
and Sundgren, 1998) reveals a substantial gap between the two legislative views, indicating 
that the Finnish bankruptcy law to some degree is characterized by Northern Europe‟s 
typically strong creditor protection.  
Finnish law defines insolvency as a situation where the debtor is unable to pay his debts 
when they fall due. The Bankruptcy Law opens for three types of insolvency proceedings in 
Finland: (1) bankruptcy, (2) reorganization of a company and (3) adjustments of the 
liabilities of a natural person. The debtor is required to be insolvent for all types of 
proceedings to take effect. There are however, no legal limitations in Finnish law to out-of-
court negotiations or agreements between the debtor and his creditors. The law does not 
govern such voluntary arrangements between the parties.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
Reorganization 
The purpose of Finland‟s reorganization procedure is to restore the financial health of a 
company and allow debtors to overcome their financial difficulties (European Judicial 
Network 2009). A company must be insolvent or in danger of insolvency by being unable to 
                                                   
35
 Bankruptcy Act 120/2004 (Konkurssilaki) 
36
 Act on the Adjustment of the Debts of a Private Individual (57/1993) entered into force on 8 February 1993.  
37
 Restructuring of Enterprises Act, Law 47/1993 
38
 Law of 247/2007 
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meet current obligations of payment, to be able to file for reorganization. The latter scenario 
of not yet established insolvency may only in special cases result in the opening of the 
proceeding. The reorganization plan is confirmed by court, this authority also appoints an 
administrator of the estate which draws up a proposal for a reorganization of the firm. The 
debtor and creditors are entitled to submit their own suggestions for the reorganization plan, 
but cannot influence the final outcome. Creditors receive payment in accordance with the 
reorganization program confirmed by the court (European Judicial Network 2009). 
During reorganization proceedings an automatic stay on creditor‟s claims is in force to 
ensure a fair distribution of payments to said creditors. The debtor keeps control of the 
company throughout the reorganization procedure under supervision by the administrator. 
The administrator will need to be consulted before management may implement certain 
economic activities. Where a debtor fulfils his payment obligations under the confirmed 
reorganization program, he is discharged from paying the amount of a debt which exceeds 
the amount confirmed in the plan (European Judicial Network 2009). 
 
Bankruptcy (liquidation) 
The concept of bankruptcy is under Finnish law related to a liquidation procedure aimed at 
realizing a debtor‟s assets and distributing the proceeds to the creditors. The debtor is 
required to be insolvent for the declaration of bankruptcy to become effective. Both the 
debtor and his creditors may file the court for a liquidation of the company. A court-
appointed receiver draws up the distribution scheme of the estate, distributes the assets and 
resolves disputes over claims. The assets are liquidated in the most profitable way, to ensure 
high proceeds from the realization. The method of sale is to be determined by the creditors 
of the estate (European Judicial Network 2009). The Finnish bankruptcy procedure generally 
results in the winding-up of a legal entity; as such no discharge is in practice available.  
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Liquidation bankruptcy 
Both legal and natural persons may be declared bankrupt according to Finnish law. 
Liquidation bankruptcy in Finland does not discharge a debtor from his debts at the closure 
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of bankruptcy proceedings. And the debtor will remain liable for debt not satisfied during 
the proceedings. However, bankrupt individuals may be discharged from the debts 
exceeding his ability to pay under the bankruptcy proceedings under Finland‟s regulation of 
Debt Adjustments for private individuals.  
 
Debt adjustment of a private individual 
Only an insolvent natural person may petition the court to have his debts adjusted. However, 
as the purpose of this legal rehabilitation procedure is to allow debtors to overcome their 
financial difficulties and start over, the proceeding can also adjust individual liability linked 
to an enterprise which has ceased trading; typically do to a recent liquidation. The debtor has 
to prove he is unable to improve his insolvency within the foreseeable future.  
The court is responsible for confirming the payback plan which normally runs for a period 
of five years. A stay on the debtor‟s assets is in force during the debt adjustment 
proceedings. Fulfillment of the payment obligations within the debt adjustment-plan, 
involves a discharge of the debtor from the rest of his debts. 
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The Netherlands 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
In the Netherlands the original Bankruptcy Act is the Faillissementswet of 1893 as amended 
by later reforms. Legislative regulation on the debt restructuring of natural debtors is 
generated by the Wet Schuldsanering Natuurlijke Personen of 1998. The Netherlands 
introduced the latter regulation as a final exit for deeply indebted individuals.  
Creditor protection in the Dutch economy is by La Porta et al ranked as medium, attributing 
the Netherland with an index-value of 2.  
Bankruptcies in the Netherlands are governed by the Dutch Bankruptcy Code 
(Faillissementswet). The code covers three separate legal proceedings; reorganization 
bankruptcy (Surseance) which only applies to companies, liquidation bankruptcy 
(Faillissement) which applies to both legal entities and natural persons, and debt 
restructuring (Schuldsanering) which is designed to apply for individuals only.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
Reorganization Bankruptcy (Surseance) 
In the Netherlands moratorium proceedings in reorganization bankruptcy are reserved for 
entrepreneurs and independent businesses (European Judicial Network 2009). The automatic 
stay is focused on retention of assets in the insolvent company, and in principle it is intended 
to bridge the enterprise‟s temporary payment problems. A debtor must be at risk of 
insolvency for this procedure to enter into effect. The stated purpose of this regulation is to 
promote restructuring of firms in financial distress and prevent unnecessary liquidation. The 
procedure is supervised by a court-appointed receiver, who manages the estate together with 
the debtor. Reorganization proceedings require a payment plan being approved by the court. 
There are no legal obstacles to restarting an enterprise for a failed entrepreneur in the 
Netherlands (European Judicial Network 2009). 
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Liquidation Bankruptcy (Faillissement) 
This type of bankruptcy proceeding is applicable to both natural and legal debtors. 
Insolvency is a requirement for the initiation of liquidation. Typically, liquidation will be 
petitioned by a creditor, but a debtor may also petition himself bankrupt. An administrator 
will be appointed by court to liquidate the debtor‟s estate and distribute the means 
accumulated from the sale among the creditors.  
The Dutch Insolvency Act provides no time limit within which a bankruptcy must be 
completed. Usually, the settlement will take no longer than a year. Still, longer completion 
periods are not exceptional. Simplified proceedings exist for Dutch bankruptcies. It is 
however required that there is insufficient assets in the estate to satisfy the competing claims. 
After a bankruptcy is completed and where limited liability is non-existent the remaining 
claims not met by the distribution will survive.  In the case of not incorporated firms 
creditors may therefore still be able to pursuit their claims towards a bankrupt entrepreneur. 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Debt restructuring 
As mentioned, legislative regulation on the debt restructuring of natural debtors is regulated 
by the Wet Schuldsanering Natuurlijke Personen of 1998. This law introduced the concept 
of discharge to Dutch debtors. Previously this arrangement had not existed. Primarily, this 
procedure is only applicable to private individuals. However, those enterprises that are not 
operated in the form of a corporate body, such as sole entrepreneurs, may also apply for debt 
restructuring under the law.  
The proceeding is initiated by a petition to the court, which oversees the liquidation of the 
available equity in the personal estate and the restructuring of debt obligations. 
Requirements for the initiating of this procedure are proven insolvency
39
 or a reasonable 
assumption that the person will not be able to continue paying his debts. In other words, 
there must be no prospect of repayment.  
                                                   
39
 Meaning, the person is in the situation of having ceased to make payments  
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If the court finds that debt restructuring is an applicable procedure, an automatic stay on 
claims from creditors is enforced until the parties have agreed upon an arrangement. 
Normally this arrangement will consist of a distribution of existing assets and a payment 
plan spanning three years, for which the debtor pays all his income above an existence 
minimum to his respective creditors.  
If a debtor upholds his debt restructuring obligations over the plan‟s horizon, the Court will 
grant him a fresh start in the form of a discharge of all outstanding debt. However, if a 
private debtor were not to uphold his obligations according to the payment plan, debt 
restructuring may be terminated (European Judicial Network 2009). The debtor will then be 
in a state of bankruptcy having no possibility to obtain a fresh start before all his debts are 
repaid.   
 
  
 129 
Belgium 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
Bankruptcy procedures in Belgium are governed by two different insolvency acts of 1997
40
, 
including (1) liquidation bankruptcy, and the governing of (2) judicial administration as a 
preliminary to bankruptcy. Before the reformation of 1997, the procedure of judicial 
composition was governed by a law of 1946
41
. In Belgium, as for all other countries in this 
sample, distinction is made between insolvency procedures for traders (companies or 
individuals) and non-traders (individuals or consumers). Traders who are temporarily unable 
to pay their debts but for whom economical recovery is possible, a legal rescue mechanism 
such as the judicial composition can be initiated. For others a formal liquidation bankruptcy 
is the only way out of financial distress.  
Meaning, judicial composition was intended for companies with prospects of continuation, 
whilst bankruptcy is aimed at irrevocable liquidation of companies without chance of 
survival. 
Belgian creditor protection in the Belgian economy is by La Porta et al. given an index-value 
of 2, meaning it provides a medium level of protection for creditors. The Belgian 
commercial court systematically collects data concerning traders facing financial difficulties. 
However, creditors and third parties do not have access to this sensitive data. Instead, this 
system of data collection is intended to urge traders in financial distress to take precautionary 
measurements in time. The court may, based on the collected data, start an inquiry into a 
specific company and the entrepreneur (trader) will in such a situation be heard before a 
competent neutral third party, such as a judge. The purpose of this regulation is to have a 
positive effect on entrepreneur‟s ability to make changes within their company before it may 
be too late. 
Insolvency implies that a debtor is unable to repay his debts to his creditors (European 
Judicial Network, 2009). Belgian legislation defines the most important insolvency 
procedures to be (1) judicial administration, (2) liquidation bankruptcy and (3) composition 
                                                   
40
 The bankruptcy procedure is governed by the Act of 8 August 1997  
41
 Regentbesluit 25 september 1946. 
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with creditors. The first two procedures are only applicable for companies
42
. A composition 
with the creditors is open for all types of debtors.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
Judicial Administration 
The requirements for opening a judicial administration in Belgium are that the debtor has not 
shown signs of bad faith and that the company‟s debt difficulties threaten the continued 
survival of the business. However, it is also required that it is reasonable to believe that that 
the company may survive as a going concern, thus restoring its financial health and 
profitability. Reorganization through judicial administration is in Belgium a court supervised 
procedure. The court-appointed receiver works out a payment plan together with the firm‟s 
management.  
During judicial administration the debtor enjoys an automatic stay on claims from creditors 
for up to six months. The debtor‟s estate may not be liquidated within this procedure. At the 
end of the negotiation period, the receiver will present the court with a restructuring 
proposition. Usually this includes the suspension of creditor‟s claims as well as transfer of 
all or part of the undertaking, whereby the creditors will be partly repaid so that business 
activity and employment are preserved and the firm can continue operating. If the 
commercial court does not approve the restructuring, it can declare the debtor bankrupt. 
 
Liquidation Bankruptcy 
A company that is insolvent, meaning it is un-creditworthy and has ceased paying creditors, 
can be declared bankrupt. This is petitioned either by the debtor or by the firm‟s creditors. 
Belgian law regulating bankruptcy proceedings states that “the sole purpose of the 
bankruptcy procedure is to wind up the assets in the bankrupt‟s estate for the benefit of his 
creditors. The bankrupt enterprise disappears from the economic and legal landscape” 
                                                   
42
 A tradesman is a person who performs commercial acts as his principal or secondary occupational activity. The main point about 
commercial acts is that they are done for profit.  
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(European Judicial Network 2009). However, the court may grant the debtor in mention a 
suspension for up to fifteen days to give the entrepreneur or management time to apply for 
judicial administration.  
A court-appointed liquidator will in the event of bankruptcy proceedings assume control of 
the estate with the task of winding it up. A firm which is declared bankrupt is not eligible for 
composition procedure with creditors, as will be described below. However, an individual 
debtor may submit an application for rehabilitation if he has paid all the sums he has been 
ordered to pay (European Judicial Network 2009). 
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
Any natural debtor is eligible for composition proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. A 
natural person in financial distress may apply for protection against creditors under the 
Belgian Bankruptcy Act as composition with creditors. However, for the procedure to take 
effect the debtor is required to be permanently unable to pay his debts and he cannot have 
applied for insolvency. According to EU‟s “Green Paper”, “Belgium has adapted its 
insolvency legislation with a view to allowing entrepreneurs to attempt to rescue businesses 
when facing temporary problems and to liquidate non-viable firms as quickly as possible. 
Courts can declare honest bankrupt entrepreneurs to be excused, allowing them to make a 
fresh start in business.” After the composition is final, all remaining debts of an individual 
debtor will be discharged and the individual is rehabilitated.  
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Ireland 
Legal basis and creditor protection 
The primary legislation governing the law of corporate insolvency is contained in the 
Companies Acts of 1963
43
, as amended by Acts until 2006. The Company Law Enforcement 
Act 2001 concerns the winding-up and insolvency provisions of firms. Insolvency in respect 
to individual debtors in Ireland is governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1988
44
. 
As opposed to British legislation La Portaet al. (1998) ranks the Irish Insolvency regulation 
as substantially less creditor-friendly. Ireland receives an index-value of 1. Personal 
bankruptcy law in Ireland unfortunately lags behind many other countries in the Western 
world. The organization named Irish Insolvency Information says, “In the UK for example 
over 67,000 individuals went bankrupt in 2008 with another 39,000 entering into the formal 
alternative to bankruptcy the Individual Voluntary Arrangement or IVA. In Ireland in the 
same year number of people entering bankruptcy was below 100” (Bankruptcy Ireland, 
2009). While it is relatively cheap to go into bankruptcy through legal arrangements such as 
the IVA in UK, it is very expensive for both debtors and creditors to petition an individual 
bankruptcy in Ireland.  
 
Business Insolvency proceedings 
The principal formal procedures for dealing with insolvent companies in Ireland are the 
following; (1) liquidation and (2) examination
45
.  
Examination  
Examination is a reorganization procedure where the purpose is to avoid liquidation of the 
company, even if the company is insolvent. Through petitioning the court a firm may be 
granted examination. The requirements for this procedure to become effective are that the 
company is unable to pay its debts and that no order has been made for the winding up of the 
company, as well as the fact that no resolution subsides for the winding-up of the company. 
                                                   
43
 Companies Act, 1963. Named the "Principal Act".  
44Bankruptcy Act, 1988 
45 The process of examination was introduced into Irish Law by the Companies Amendment Act 1990 (CAA). 
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In addition, the court must be convinced that it is reasonable to believe that the company will 
survive as a going concern.  
If the court is satisfied the requirements are met, an examiner will be appointed and the firm 
is granted an automatic stay of seventy days, which may be extended to a hundred days. The 
examiner will in addition to supervision of management, formulate a plan of arrangements to 
ensure the company‟s survival. A confirmation of the proposal by the court is binding for all 
claimants.  
 
Liquidation 
The concept of liquidation in Ireland applies only to companies. A winding up of an 
individual debtor‟s assets is, as in the UK named bankruptcy. Both the debtor and its 
creditors may petition the liquidation of a company. This is a terminal process in which a 
court-appointed liquidator sees to the payment of creditors by realization of the estate. 
Ultimately the company is dissolved.  
 
Individual Insolvency proceedings 
As mentioned the concept of bankruptcy in Ireland applies only to debtors who are 
individuals. To be judged bankrupt the natural debtor must have committed an “act of 
bankruptcy” as stated in The Irish Bankruptcy Act of 1963. 
 
Arrangement 
An individual pending for bankruptcy may petition for arrangement, which involves a 
protection from bankruptcy proceedings in the form of an automatic stay on assets. Within 
this period the debtor must present to his creditors an offer of composition. The acceptance 
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of the composition by three-fifths
46
 of the claimants will be binding for all creditors. If the 
arrangement is not accepted by the creditors, the court will judge the debtor bankrupt.  
 
Bankruptcy 
Under the Irish Bankruptcy Act a court-appointed liquidator will sell the individual 
bankrupt‟s assets and distribute the proceeds to the creditors, except for certain assets 
necessary for the debtor‟s work or existence minimum. A bankrupt suffers certain statutory 
disabilities such as not being entitled to operate a bank account, being prohibited from 
company management and being prohibited from being a Member of Parliament or of a 
local authority. 
There exists a possibility for a natural debtor to obtain discharge under Irish law. However, 
it is required that the bankruptcy has subsisted for 12 years and the court must be persuaded 
that it is reasonable and proper to grant a discharge from Bankruptcy
47
. The OECD observes 
that “firm exit appears to be a disincentive (to entrepreneurship) in Ireland. Creditors have 
claims on bankrupt firm‟s assets for up to twelve years” (OECD 2001b). In principle, a 
discharged debtor in Ireland may start a business on equal terms as previously non-bankrupt 
entrepreneurs. Still, the Irish government recognize the fact that at “a commercial level a 
discharged Bankrupt will presumably have difficulty getting any kind of credit” (European 
Judicial Network 2009). 
 
 
 
                                                   
46
 In both number and value 
47
 Legal basis: Section 85 (4) (c) of the Irish Bankruptcy Act. 
Appendix C 
Figures 
Below are graphical representations of each country‟s bankruptcy and entry rate, to be able 
to show the diversity within key variables for the sample countries. 
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